

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MACHINATIONS: A NEW LOOK AT SIR GEORGE GREY'S PLANS FOR BRITISH KAFFRARIAN

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Opsomming

In 1855 het Sir George Grey daarin geslaag om 'n onwillige Britse regering te ooreed om 'n jaarlikse bedrag van £40 000 by te dra vir die onderhoud van Brits Kaffraria. Terselfdertyd het hy 'n toekenning van £5 000 van die Kaapse Tesourie aangebied, alhoewel hierdie aanbod nooit voor die nuut gevormde parlement gedien het nie. Hierdie referaat ondersoek hoe Grey dit kon regkry, asook die bron van die Kaap se klaarblyklike vrygewigheid.

Sir George Grey, once the idol of South African historians, has become the object of reproach in recent revisionist studies. The change in attitude has mostly to do with a historiographical shift, from a focus that was once centred predominantly on the White ruling elite to one that concentrates more on the effects of colonialism on the indigenous populations of southern Africa. Early historians like John Rutherford praised Grey for the apparent progress of his administration. Revisionist historians like Jeff Peires, on the other hand, revile the Governor for his attitude towards the African peoples which they believe was somehow instrumental in causing such things as the Cattle Killing episode within British Kaffraria and in the trans-Keian territory.¹

Unsolved questions

There is, however, another side to Grey's governorship which needs to be brought under the spotlight: how does one account for his very successful economic policy which brought so much wealth to the Cape Colony? It is true that wool exports were causing a dramatic increase in revenue as sheep farming, which was introduced to the colony in the 1840s, began to produce a profit.² Of equal importance, however, was the British Government's injection of £40 000 per annum into British Kaffraria, a windfall which completely altered the economic equilibrium in the territory for several decades.

What is of interest here is both how Grey persuaded a reluctant Colonial Office to donate such a massive annual sum and also how he apparently managed to induce a more reluctant Cape parliament to contribute an annual grant of £5 000 to neighbouring British Kaffraria. This latter feat is doubly perplexing, not only in view of the Cape's previous aversion to part with even the most insignificant amounts but also because, if Rutherford is correct, the money was never actually voted through the Colonial parliament.³ This paper will offer a solution to both puzzles.

¹ See J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey* (London, 1961), pp. 305-311; J. B. Peires, *The dead will arise* (1989), pp. 45-46.

² V. Bickford-Smith, "Cape Town at the advent of the Mineral Revolution (c. 1875): Economic activity and social structure" in *Studies in the History of Cape Town*, vol 6 (1988), pp. 61-63.

³ Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, pp. 315.

Plans for creating Black Englishmen

Sir George Grey began his governorship of the Cape Colony in December 1854. He inherited a frontier strategy of special commissioners and magistrates which was backed up by a strong military presence, a policy that was the hallmark of Sir Harry Smith's regime. The Smith style of operation, however, had seen the frontier explode into yet another war (Mlanjeni War, 1850-1853) which spread into the trans-Keian territories and spilt over even into the Orange River Sovereignty.

The conflagration was eventually extinguished during the Honourable Sir George Cathcart's term of office, but the war had cost the British Treasury a small fortune. The Colonial Office therefore needed a complete rethink on the future of southern Africa and it arrived at a many faceted solution. This included recognising the Boers of the Transvaal region as independent, abandoning the Orange River Sovereignty and making the colonists in the Cape Colony more responsible for their actions by establishing a Representative Government.⁴

The responsibility for ushering in the new system was then handed to Sir George Grey, the imperial blue-eyed boy who was at that moment wallowing in the confidence of the British government after his apparent New Zealand success. When Grey arrived at the Cape, he was already armed with his own personal programme for British Kaffraria, one based on his earlier plan for the Maoris of New Zealand.

He wanted to convert the amaXhosa to his personal ideal of civilization and Christianity but to do this, he argued, he needed to "open up" the territory and create employment. This would make the people dependent upon the British style of economy and at the same time would break the power of the Chiefs. For all this to happen, however, he needed institutions of what he termed a "civil character" (schools, hospitals and mission stations) which he believed would have a dramatic acculturating effect.

Yet the key feature of Grey's plan, and around which all else revolved, was an intense immigration scheme. The Governor ultimately wanted some 5 000 retired British military officers (with their wives and children) to settle in British Kaffraria. Not only would that create a White population of some 20 000 people in the region (once the women and children were included) but the men, being ex-soldiers, would form the nucleus of a frontier army should that be needed.⁵

Fundamental to the success of this plan was the need for money • and lots of it. Grey estimated that the scheme would cost £45 000 per annum but clearly the funds could not be raised locally. Not only did the Cape Colony not have such means at its disposal but, even if it did, no amount of pleading would have coaxed such a sum from the new parliament, only to see it transferred to the British Kaffrarian coffers. Indeed, between 1848 and 1850, the colonial treasurers had consistently refused to spend even the most trifling sum so as to build a desperately needed jetty at East London, on the grounds

⁴ The *Sand River Convention* was concluded in 1852, the *Bloemfontein Convention* in 1854, while the new Cape constitution went into effect in 1853.

⁵ Imperial Blue Books (PP) 1854-55. XXXVIII (1969), pp. 38, 54-55. Grey to Grey, 22 December 1854, 7 March 1855.

that they were not prepared to give financial aid of any description to British Kaffraria.⁶

Political manoeuvring

Grey had therefore to cajole the money out of a reluctant British Treasury and he did so through a combination of argument and threat. He knew that the British Government was paranoid about the possibility of yet another frontier war. He also knew that almost any story he devised to fuel these fears would pass virtually unchallenged by his superiors in England who lived so far away that they were dependent upon his telling the real story without major embellishment. He therefore conceived a clever trick of prophesying yet another impending frontier war that would incur excessive expenditure but which could be prevented by the adoption of his supposedly inexpensive plan. Although his 'solution' would cost a huge sum, it was nevertheless far cheaper than the millions which a war would consume.⁷

Grey set about this task of persuasion with speed and dedication, and the timing of his despatches is most significant. Within only three days of his arrival at the Cape, he was already reporting what Rutherford called "the curious war scare". The "Fingoes", Grey informed the Colonial Office, once a "broken and scattered tribe... humble and docile", were now "collected into tribes... become rich and powerful". Indeed, he wrote, there were at that very moment so many warriors that it was becoming difficult to maintain the peace. Moreover, it was a point common in history, he argued, that a country which entrusted its defence to "semi-barbarous allies" would eventually be militarily challenged by those very partners. Such was the case in British Kaffraria.⁸

Grey allowed a mere week to pass before he was again inflaming the fears of the paranoid Colonial Office, anxiety that was aggravated by the cost of a British expedition against Russia on the Crimean Peninsula. All was not well in Kaffraria, he wrote, and he feared that "an immediate outbreak" was "determined upon". Farmers were already abandoning their homes and he was being forced to send a military force *post haste* to the frontier, while it might be necessary even to call for reinforcements from Mauritius. Yet, he hastily added, he was reluctant to take any step which would alarm "the suspicious minds of the natives" and which might perhaps "hurry on the very crises" he was "anxious to avoid".⁹

A further three days were allowed to pass before the Governor, having now been at the helm for a mere two weeks, was ready to propose his final solution to the "crises". First, however, he had to give the blade one more turn. There was no doubt, he wrote to the Colonial Office, that war was imminent although he hoped to maintain a few months of "a state of tranquillity" so as to put his plan into effect. The previous war, he said, had

⁶ K. P. T. Tankard, "Strangulation of a port: East London, 1847-1873" in *Contree: Journal for South African Urban and Regional History*, 23 (1988), p. 7.

⁷ PP 1854-55, XXXVIII [1969], p. 38. Grey to Grey, 19 December 1854, 22 December 1854, 30 December 1855. See also Peires, *The dead will arise*, pp. 55-56.

⁸ PP 1854-55, XXXVIII [1969], pp. 36-38, 54. Grey to Grey, 22 December 1854. See Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 309.

⁹ PP 1854-55, XXXVIII [1969], p. 36. Grey to Grey, 19 December 1854.

cost as much as £1 million per annum, as well as maintaining a constant demand on troops. The next war, "if one [did] unhappily take place", would be far more expensive and would demand the deployment of an even greater force.

During the Mlanjeni War, he argued, the British were able to give total concentration to the military effort because their troops were not engaged elsewhere. Circumstances, however, were now very different because of Britain's involvement in the Crimean War. It was therefore critical, he argued, that immediate action be taken. The rumours of war among the "Fingoes", together with the "unease" among the Xhosa tribes, meant that every day the imperial forces were "expecting a blow to be struck" although, as Rutherford admitted, the alarm "grew out of nothing". The Cape's Colonial Secretary, Rutherford said, would later admit that the origin of the war scare was a total mystery and the grounds for it were wholly inadequate.¹⁰

It was, however, the ideal excuse for the Governor to unveil his grand scheme for the acculturation of the Xhosa people, with the resulting financial implications. Britain, of course, would have to foot the bill for at least £40 000, although Grey hastily added that he had no doubt the rest of the funds could be raised locally. The carrot he offered was irresistible: the maintenance of peace and therefore a possible reduction in costs after only three years, with further reductions during the following decade. Nevertheless, he stressed that the sum he proposed as an annual expenditure for his project was "altogether inconsiderable" compared with the cost of "a single month of war".¹¹

Grey's assumptions were correct. The Colonial Office was indeed desperately afraid of a frontier war and was not in a position to question the exact truth of his statements. It therefore accepted his proposal in its entirety and urgently advertised for pensioner soldiers to emigrate to British Kaffraria. The unexpected then happened. The Governor had believed that South Africa would be as attractive to colonists as New Zealand had been but he was wrong. Only 107 volunteers responded to the call, far from even the initial quota of 2 000 which Grey had suggested.

The German settler scheme

So convincing had the Governor's rhetoric been, however, that Secretary of State Molesworth unilaterally cancelled Grey's plan and immediately replaced it with a new one: to send out as many demobbed German soldiers from the Anglo-German Legion as possible. These were men who had been recruited to fight in the Crimean War but had not yet seen action. By 1856 the war was ended, leaving Britain with the problem of what to do with the men who were still under contract for a further year. Since Grey had emphasised that he desperately wanted retired soldiers for the frontier, the Colonial Office decided to kill two birds with one stone and send him some 2 000 Germans.

The Governor was therefore granted his wish but it was not quite what he had expected. Indeed, the Anglo-German Legion was nowhere near the category of soldier he had requested but somehow the Colonial Office had concentrated on the military

¹⁰ PP 1854-55, XXXVIII [1969], p. 36-38, 54. Grey to Grey, 22 December 1854, 7 March 1855. See also Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 309.

¹¹ PP 1854-55, XXXVIII [1969], pp. 36-38, 54. Grey to Grey, 22 December 1854, 7 March 1855.

focus, conveniently forgetting the emphasis that Grey had made on settler families. Wives and children would result in a stable settlement but few of the Legionnaires were married and most were much younger than the pensioners whom Grey had envisaged. Moreover, they were men who had joined the Legion to make a living from warfare, not from settling as farmers in a remote British colony.

Grey had in fact foreseen many of these problems and attempted to persuade the Colonial Office to send out peasant families from Germany rather than the soldiers, arguing that the lack of females would be disastrous to the whole community as it would, he said, cause "great immorality ...and great expense". The soldiers, he wrote, would roam the country in search of females, would probably "be frequently murdered by the native population" and would be "quite useless" as a defence for the Colony.¹²

The Colonial Office, however, stubbornly defended its decision and was not prepared to budge. The first priority now, it argued, was to send out a large group of single females rather than promote further German immigration and it accordingly arranged for a consignment of Irish women (153 in total) to be sent to British Kaffraria aboard the *Lady Kennaway* to become wives for the more than 1 500 German bachelors. The "Kennaway girls", as they have been dubbed, landed at East London in November 1857, whereupon the majority were transported to King William's Town and then to Graham's Town in the search for employment.¹³

Grey in fact was quite correct in his supposition that all this would not promote his objectives. Indeed, the British Kaffrarian authorities put every obstacle in the way of the women setting up relations with the German soldiers whom they claimed were a profligate bunch of ne'er-do-wells. In the meantime, many of the soldiers continued to seek adventure and when the Indian Mutiny broke out in 1858, more than half volunteered to join the British army.¹⁴

Grey continued valiantly to patch up his original plan but, since he could not persuade the Colonial Office to alter its decision about a German peasant settlement, he decided that the Cape would have to see to its own immigration. In August 1857 he entered into a contract with a Hamburg firm, Godeffroy and Son, by which some 2 000 German peasants would be shipped to British Kaffraria during the 1858 shipping season.¹⁵ He informed the Colonial Office of his actions only in December 1857 and was severely reprimanded for entering into such a contract without permission and contrary to clearly expressed wishes.

¹² PP 1857-58 XL (389), p. 11. Grey to Labouchere, 25 February 1857.

¹³ PP 1857-58, XL (389), p. 6-7. Labouchere to Grey, 5 June 1857. See K. P. T. Tankard, "The Kennaway Girls" in D. P. McCracken (ed), *The Irish in Southern Africa, 1795-1910* (Durban, 1992), pp. 278-286.

¹⁴ E. L. G. Schnell, "German immigration to the Cape with special reference to (a) The German Military Settlement of 1857; (b) The Settlement of the German Immigrants of 1858". Ph. D., Rhodes University (1952), pp. 92-93. J. F. Schwär & Jardine (ed.), *The Journal of Gustav Steinbart* (Port Elizabeth, 1975), p. 13.

¹⁵ PP 1857-1858, XL (389), pp. 14-15. Grey to Labouchere, 26 December 1857. See also Schnell, "German immigration to the Cape", pp. 213-216.

The Colonial Office responded by cancelling what was left of the scheme and paying a penalty of £5 000 to Godeffroy, a sum that it deducted from the British Kaffrarian grant. From that moment on, Grey discovered that his star was fading. The subsidy for British Kaffraria was halved in 1858, to be reduced to a mere £15 000 once the payment to Godeffroy had been deducted.¹⁶ By 1859 the Governor again found himself at odds with the British Government, this time over his proposed southern African federation scheme and his governorship was summarily terminated.

Problems with customs revenue

So much for the political machinations surrounding Grey's plans for British Kaffraria. The financial intrigue was no less intricate. It has already been explained that Grey estimated an annual sum of £45 000 was needed for his plan to work, although he hastened to assure the Colonial Office that he was certain that he could raise £5 000 of that sum locally. The British Government quickly accepted this offer, advising Grey that an annual grant of £40 000 would be budgeted but only if the Cape Colony provided the rest of the funds from its own account. Rutherford postulated that the remaining money probably came from the Cape Treasury but, as has been pointed out, the money was never actually voted through the Colonial budget.

Rutherford's conclusion is doubtful. Given the Cape Colony's unwillingness to spend even the smallest amount on East London, it is highly unlikely that its parliament would ever have consented to so great an amount as £5 000 being excised from its Treasury as a direct gift to the new Crown Colony, even though such a sum might result in a safer frontier. The truth is that the Cape's share of the British Kaffrarian subsidy did not come out of its colonial coffers at all. Indeed, it originated elsewhere, in a clever scheme to fleece the British Government in a way that would satisfy all the parties concerned.

To understand this, one has to go back to the original Colonial Office plans for British Kaffraria as they were devised in 1846. The territory had been conceived as a protectorate to be governed in the best interests of the Xhosa population, and its port would be at the Buffalo River mouth. When Sir Harry Smith had arrived in December 1847, it was still taken for granted that the port of "London", as it was then named, would be the British Kaffrarian harbour but there was a major hiccup in the plan.

When Smith set sail for Cape Town to take up his High Commissionership, he left the vital Letters Patent behind, and he therefore could not create the protectorate along the lines so carefully mapped out. Instead, he called upon his imaginary powers as High Commissioner and established the Crown Colony in his own name.¹⁷ Yet without the Letters Patent, there could be no civilian government and a military regime was not equipped to handle such civil things as the collection of customs revenue. As early as January 1848, it was already clear that "London" was quickly becoming the route for smuggling goods into the Cape Colony, into the Orange River Sovereignty and, indeed, even into Natal. Until the Letters Patent arrived, therefore, Smith was caught with the

¹⁶ PP 1857-58, XL (389), pp. 7-9. Stanley to Grey, 4 May 1858, 20 May 1859. See also Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, pp. 395-396.

¹⁷ See J. Benyon, *Proconsul and paramountcy in South Africa* (1980), pp. 53-54.

impossibility of using a military machine to collect customs.

The Governor responded with what he believed would be a simple and short-lived expedient: annexing the port (now with its new name of "East London") to the Cape Colony and then using the colonial civil service to police the collection of the vital customs revenue. That system would last only until the arrival and publication of the Letters Patent but, because of interminable delays, this publication was shelved for more than a decade. The *ad hoc* arrangement would remain in operation until 1859 when the port would at last be reunited with British Kaffraria.

The system was not a happy one. The Cape Colony perceived the reality of the situation: that East London was merely under its temporary guardianship which could end at any time. The colonial government therefore refused to spend even the most modest sum of money on the port, only to see it ultimately lost to British Kaffraria. At the same time, however, the Cape Colony was quite content to collect customs revenue at East London and absorb the money into the colonial coffers, a circumstance which the British Kaffrarian authorities naturally resented.

Local opinion was vociferous that East London should be returned immediately to British Kaffraria. Despite the absence of the vital Letters Patent, a *de facto* government did evolve and it had ever increasing expenses to meet. Every penny was therefore vital. Matthew Jennings, East London's collector of customs, claimed that it was simply "jealousy" among "certain gentlemen in Cape Town" which prevented both the establishment of British Kaffraria as a fully fledged Crown Colony and the transfer of East London to that territory. One thing was quite certain, he wrote to Chief Commissioner John Maclean: East London "*must* be the Port of British Kaffraria" and the taxes collected there had to be recognised as Kaffrarian revenue.

If the Cape Government would not make an annual compensation, Jennings argued, then "such measures" had to be adopted that would prevent them "receiving any sums that of right [belonged] to Kaffraria." He believed therefore that the first objective was to get an Order in Council which would give British Kaffraria the right to regulate its own customs tariff, and which ought to be done, he said, even before East London was reunited with that territory. As soon as they had control over the port, together with the authority of regulating the customs tariff, they would have the power of preventing the Cape Colony from "receiving" their revenue.¹⁸

It is apparent that constant pressure on the Cape administration was successful. Although East London was not transferred to British Kaffraria until 1859, the collection of documents in the Cape Archives makes it clear that instructions were given sometime towards the end of 1854 for a closer union between the port and British Kaffraria. Up till that date, all the customs returns were sent to Cape Town and these were stored as part of the Government House documents.¹⁹ There are no records of customs returns for the year 1855 but between 1856 and 1860, these documents were haphazardly collected and were stored in the British Kaffrarian files. Only after 1860, when East London was indeed officially reunited with that territory, did the returns

¹⁸ Cape Town Archives (CA), BK 64. Jennings to Maclean, 4 September 1854.

¹⁹ See CA, GH 8/24.

become stored again in an orderly fashion.²⁰

Economic intrigue

An important question, which no historian has until now successfully explained, is what became of this customs revenue. Indeed, the answer to this question gives an important reflection about the source of the Cape Colony's £5 000 contribution to British Kaffraria. In January 1854 Jennings was asked to submit an estimate of the overland trade between the Cape Colony and the new protectorate. His assessment revealed that the value of imports for 1853 had amounted to approximately £52 300, on which the duty lost to the new territory was in the region of £3 923. In a separate report, the Collector of Customs in Cape Town calculated that the duty on goods reshipped to British Kaffraria from Cape Town and Port Elizabeth during 1853 amounted to £4 424 in lost revenue.²¹

The two calculations revealed little of the real nature of customs duties lost to British Kaffraria because neither the Cape nor the British Kaffrarian governments had accurate trade records. The Cape officials had been forced to make their calculations "from the several Shippers in Cape Town, and Port Elizabeth". Jennings at East London, on the other hand, had collected his information from the local importers, as well as those in King William's Town. He confessed, however, that he had found it immeasurably difficult to arrive at an absolute figure because, he said, "their account keeping" was "so exceedingly novel and diversified". Jennings therefore suggested that inland customs houses needed to be established within British Kaffraria itself to recoup the lost revenue.²²

Chief Commissioner Maclean adopted Jennings's viewpoint but saw the creation of inland customs houses as an option to be used only when all else had failed. It was his belief that the most convenient plan was for the Cape Treasury to pay an annual lump sum to British Kaffraria in compensation for lost customs revenue. He suggested an amount of £4 000 but that, he said, was in fact a "low estimate of the present customs Revenue". Nevertheless, such a sum would obviate the necessity of creating another port for British Kaffraria or of establishing inland excise establishments. Yet, he said, British Kaffraria needed the money because it was the principle source "from which a revenue could be raised."²³

In 1855 Governor Grey committed the Cape Government to a grant of £5 000 for British Kaffraria as a means of gaining an extra £40 000 from the British taxpayer. He did so, says Rutherford, without consulting parliament. At the same time, customs records were transferred from the Cape Colony to British Kaffraria. It is quite clear therefore that the £5 000 in question represented the estimation of revenue which the Cape Colony was illegally syphoning off from British Kaffrarian customs revenue and which, as every

²⁰ See CA, BK 64.

²¹ CA, BK 64. Jennings to Maclean, 16 January 1854. CA, GH 8/24. Field to the Colonial Secretary, 9 February 1854.

²² CA, BK 64. Jennings to Maclean, 16 January 1854.

²³ CA, BK 371, No 170, p. 432. Maclean to Liddle, 26 August 1854.

honest politician accepted, had to be returned to its rightful owner.

Indeed, such a move made all the players happy. Britain believed that the Cape Colony was making a just contribution to the expenses of British Kaffraria. The Cape politicians knew that the funds were merely a redirection of customs revenue that should have been collected in British Kaffraria in the first place. The British Kaffrarian officials knew that they were not only regaining most of their lost funds but were also realising an extra £40 000 to boot. It was therefore in the best interests of the local parties to remain tight-lipped.

A tithe for the church and an economic squeeze

There is another important feature to Grey's subsidy strategy. Part of the Governor's acculturation plan was to establish mission stations throughout British Kaffraria which would bring both education and Christianity to the Xhosa people. The success of this plan depended again on funding and Grey rose to the occasion by awarding a grant of £4 000 to the missionary effort.²⁴ The precise figure is important because it represents exactly a tithe of the British contribution of £40 000 to British Kaffraria. Grey did not tithe the other £5 000, the money which the Cape Colony was supposedly contributing, indicating again that that sum was not a gift at all but was in fact the legal taxation on goods bound for British Kaffraria, and which money was therefore rightly owed to that territory. Since it was not a donation, therefore, it would not be tithed.

By 1859, however, Sir George Grey's star was fading. He had angered the Colonial Office over the question of German peasant immigration and also by attempting to bring the two British colonies and the Boer republics into a southern African confederation. The Colonial Office responded to the former scheme by halving its subsidy to British Kaffraria and as early as 1860 the grant was brought to an end. Grey himself was recalled in disgrace.

The financial squeeze placed the political situation of British Kaffraria in a new perspective. Despite a growth in population, the territory was still not economically viable and this had led Grey to consider the possibility of annexing the territory to the Cape Colony but the parliament in Cape Town rejected his plan. The Governor was forced rather to restore East London to British Kaffraria, thereupon establishing civilian rule for the first time and normalising the collection of customs duties.²⁵

The moment, however, was not an opportune one. British Kaffraria had come to rely on the grant from the Imperial Government, which money had now been suddenly cut off in an angry gesture at Grey's unilateral actions. Furthermore, within a matter of years a serious recession would retard economic growth within the Empire and would have a major impact on British Kaffraria. East London, having languished in a nether world

²⁴ M. M. Goedhals, "Anglican Missionary policy in the Diocese of Grahamstown under the first two Bishops, 1853-1871", Masters Thesis, Rhodes University (1979), p. 14; Peires, *The dead will arise*, pp. 58-59.

²⁵ G. M. Theal, *History of South Africa since 1795*, vol. 7 (1964), p. 223. Grey's speech to Parliament, 16 March 1859. Annexures to Papers in Cape Parliament, GG44-62, pp. 1-2. Grey to Lytton, 11 February 1859, 17 June 1859.

for more than a decade, had been the worst effected town in the political machinations because British Kaffrarian trade which should have been routed through the port was forced to take an alternate path through Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown.²⁶ The town would never fully recover from this, while British Kaffraria itself survived a mere five years before its lack of financial viability quickly forced it into a union with the Cape Colony.

Conclusion

The evidence suggests that Sir George Grey made use of frequent threats of an imminent outbreak of war on the frontier to frighten a British Government, already overburdened by the international conflict in Crimea, into agreeing to a major contribution to British Kaffraria. He further offered a substantial injection of money from the Cape Treasury, knowing full well that the colonial parliament would never agree. There was, however, no need to seek the Cape's consent. By 1854, arrangements were already nearly complete for a sum of about £5 000 to be given to British Kaffraria as just compensation for lost customs revenue on goods destined for the new protectorate. In one easy movement, therefore, Grey appeased the anger of the British Kaffrarian administrators by redirecting their lost revenue, gained an extra £40 000 from a reluctant British Treasury and let the Cape parliament off the hook by not needing to budget any part of its taxes as a financial support for their frontier neighbour. From the White colonial point of view, therefore, Grey's economic machinations established an invaluable spur to prosperity in the sub-continent.

²⁶ Tankard, "Strangulation of a port", pp. 5-11.