POSTMODERNISM AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY [1]

Norman Etherington
(Department of History, University of Western Australia)

THE EMERGENCE OF A RADICAL HISTORY

Most likely future South Africans will look back to the years between 1960 and 1990 as a golden age of historical writing. More works about the past were published in those three decades than in the preceding three centuries. Centres for the study of South African history flourished not only at home but in several other countries. The reasons for this efflorescence of scholarship seem fairly obvious. In the years between the tragedy of Sharpeville and Mandela's triumphant emergence from prison, historians of many different tendencies saw their research as a useful political tool in the fight against injustice.

Conservative historical writing, even of the Afrikaner nationalist variety, practically disappeared during those years. Liberal historians continued to write in accordance with the venerable conviction that, 'you shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free'. A vigorous radical history appeared, pooh-poohing the idea that any truth can exist uncontaminated by ideology, but feeling a similar urgency to liberate oppressed minds and bodies through a 'demystified' understanding of the past. Quarrels among the various dominant schools of thought, were as Bill Freund recently observed, 'really quarrels within a [single] master-narrative' — a master narrative whose essence was not 'class, or male superiority or even Marxism', but 'simply the Struggle' [2]. What next, now that the prize is won and the struggle is over?

There are plenty who would say 'la luta continua', but the stronger tendency at the moment is to flirt with the possibilities of

This paper was published in the *South African Review of Books*, 44, July/August 1996 and is reprinted with the kind permission of the author - in the interests of encouraging debate.

"The art of writing history" in the *South African Review of Books*, 33,September/ October 1994.

postmodernism, a current in contemporary life so vast as to defy encapsulation. One of the best statements I have read about it comes from an acolyte, Dick Hebdige

> when it becomes possible for people to describe as 'postmodern' the decor of a room, the design of a building, the diagesis of a film, the construction of a record, or a scratch video, a television commercial, or an arts documentary, or the inter-textual relations between them, the layout of a page in a fashion magazine or critical journal, an anti-teleological tendency within epistemology, the attack on the metaphysics of presence, a general attenuation of feeling, the collective chagrin and morbid projections of a post War generation of baby boomers confronting disillusioned middle age, the predicament of 'reflexivity', a group of rhetorical tropes, a proliferation of surfaces, a new phase in commodity fetishism, a fascination for images, codes and styles, a process of cultural, political or existential fragmentation and/or crisis, the 'decentring' of the subject, an 'incredulity towards meta-narratives', the replacement of unitary power axes by a plurality of power/discourse formations, the 'implosion of meaning', the collapse of cultural hierarchies, the dread engendered by the threat of nuclear self-destruction, the decline of the University, the functioning and effects of the new miniaturised technologies, broad societal and economic shifts into a 'media', 'consumer', or 'multinational' phase, a sense... of placelessness... or the abandonment of placelessness ... or... a generalised substitution of spatial for temporal co-ordinates - when it becomes possible to describe all these things as 'postmodern'... then it's clear that we are in the presence of a buzzword.[3]

Nobody ever could or did make such a statement about liberalism or neo-Marxism. If to be postmodern is simply to breathe the atmosphere of the present era, to be surrounded by the noise of instantaneous communications round the world, to witness the collapse of hard and fast national boundaries, then we are all postmodernists now.

D. Hebdige, 'A report on the Western Front: Postmodernism and the "Politics" of style', in Chris Jenks, (ed.), *Cultural Reproduction* (1983), quoted in C. Jenks, *Culture: Key ideas* (1994), pp. 137-138.

THE END OF IDEOLOGY AND POSTMODERNISM

In academic circles, however, postmodernism means more. For some it is the literary critics' toolbox put together by Jacques Derrida and his 'deconstructionist' followers. For certain conservative thinkers, it is 'the end of ideology' announced two decades ago by the American sociologist Daniel Bell, and 'the end of history' hailed by Francis Fukuyama in 1989. For others it is a philosophical stance of extreme scepticism about the possibility of knowledge of any sort, particularly those claims to knowledge about the past embodied in historical writing.

For others, it is a manifesto of liberation from the shackles of failed 'projects': Liberal Humanism, the Enlightenment, Marxism, Progress, Grand Narrative. In its more positive guises, postmodernism bids us attend to difference (différance): subaltern cultures, gendered understandings, subversive discourses.

I propose to take these academic variations on the theme of postmodernism one by one and muse on their implications for future historical writing about South Africa.

THE DECONSTRUCTIONISTTOOL KIT ANDTWITCHY HISTORIANS

First, the deconstructionist tool kit. There is every reason to applaud the renewed attention given to textual analysis as a result of postmodernist interventions. It is salutary to be reminded that history is a branch of literature and, as such, subject to critical scrutiny. Attention to rhetoric, narrative gaps and silences does indeed 'open spaces' for more sophisticated understandings of what we historians do. Though the language employed by critical theorists after Derrida is initially intimidating, it is worth learning. (Even if we are thirty years late.)

The quarrel over literary canons is not our quarrel. Historians are accustomed to finding useful sources in literary productions condemned as shoddy goods by yesterday's Leavisites and Great Book fanatics. African (and South African) historians led the charge against Eurocentric attempts at spurious 'quality control'.

The spread of critical theory to the visual arts has also had a stimulating effect on historical practice. We used to write our words and look for pictures after we found a publisher. The pictures - bound together all higgledy-piggledy at the centre of the book - generally added nothing to our arguments. Now historians are looking at

visual materials in search of evidence that cannot be found in written documents. Painting, sculpture, cinema, popular music all have yielded new understandings to historians who have learned to 'read' them. The breakthrough provided by postmodern critical theory was to remove the quest for 'quality' from its privileged position in discussions of the visual arts. Historians can now share a common language of textual analysis.

Of course, most of us are not too good at it, because we were given precious little visual training in our apprenticeships. It can be acutely embarrassing to watch a sophisticated historical intelligence naively struggling to find the 'male spaces' in a photographic tableau or to read a painting 'against the grain'. But we have to try. And we have a responsibility to give our students the training we missed. Following a lecture on the Russian Revolution with a screening of the film, 'Battleship Potemkin' or a talk on apartheid with Sydney Poitier in *Cry the Beloved Country* is not good enough. When we use cinema in our teaching we must break it up with analysis and comment. Otherwise, it is no better than the old photos bound together at the centre of our books.

A few years ago, critical theory in the guise of 'the new historicism' was also promising to restore lost linkages between literature and history. Stephen Greenblatt's contextualising of Shakespeare scraped away at the marbled image of perfection to reveal a mottled base of Elizabethan politics, colonialism and violence. Edward Said's *Orientalism* exposed the historical processes which had constructed an image of Islam as alien, threatening and irrational - the archetypal Other. Both enterprises inspired good new work on South African literary figures and meshed well with political economy approaches to South African history.

More recently, however, the enemies of new historicism within the camp of literary theory have claimed victory by arguing that there is no history 'out there' which exists distinct from texts. There are simply other texts which the new historicists pick over for their pretended projects of contextualisation. Some of these are called historical or history, but they can claim no privileges as representations of an unknowable previous time.

It is at this point that most of us practising historians get twitchy. However, the epistemological challenge too has to be faced. My own response has been to ask the Bronx question: so what else is

new already? Those who enjoy trashing The Enlightenment generally go back to Descartes and his centred, knowing subject *Cogito ergo sunt?* Not on your decentred unconstitutable and unknowable Nelly. In leaping for Descartes people pass over the vitally interesting figure of David Hume, who defined the sceptical position with unsurpassed clarity in his *Enquiry concerning human understanding* and *treatise of human nature.*

> There are some philosophers [he wrote] who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our Self...Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of *self*, after the manner it is here explain'd... For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception.[4]

As for other people:

> ...they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement... The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.[5]

This led him to proclaim, if not the death, at least the decomposition, of the author:

> ...the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other. Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chases another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expell'd in its turn. In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and

La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, (1985), pp. 256-257.
Hume, *Enquiry*, p. 258.

> give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts.[6]

Knowing so little of ourselves, we could know little of what we supposed to be the past:

> I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any private or even public history, at the place where it is said to happen; much more when the scene is removed to ever so small a distance. Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and judgement, which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions.[7]

Having made these sensational discoveries, Hume abandoned philosophy and became a historian.

How did he manage the trick? Partly by noticing that philosophical sceptics, like present-day postmodernists, generally check their peculiar insights and ways of talking at the desk when they walk into a pub. Partly by noticing that certain conventions govern our discourse about the past, even among those who recognise we cannot verify our supposed knowledge of previous events. Given that the world of a thousand years ago is no less knowable than the world of half an hour ago, historical knowledge is no less nor more provisional than most other forms of knowledge.

POSTMODERN PARADIGMS AND DISCOURSES

Hume's critique of the subject who purports to know and the objects of quests for knowledge has been refined and extended by twentieth century historians. J. P. Bury told us that progress is an idea, not a fact - and a fairly recent idea at that. Herbert Butterfield in *The Whig interpretation of history* exposed the teleological assumption which informed so much previous historical writing. E. H. Carr pointed out the precarious, provisional nature of what we call 'historical facts'. The historian of science, Thomas Kuhn, argued cogently that knowledge itself is inescapably informed by the sociological apparatus that generates it and the prevailing mindsets of its era. What he taught us to call paradigms, Foucault serves up in French as *epistemes*. Like Raphael Samuel, I call attention to these works not in order to dismiss the postmodern critique of historical knowledge, but to affirm it as the common wisdom of the

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 268.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

best present-day practitioners.

There are other voices of postmodernism who treat the past as all *too* knowable. Their discourses bristle with references to colonialism, racism and patriarchy as phenomena whose past we can investigate and believe in. Many voices denounce the 'Enlightenment Project' as a bad experiment whose failure is proved by totalitarianism, Hiroshima, Stalin's gulags and a host of other evils allegedly caused by modernism and modernity. How should historians regard these statements about the past? It may be that we should treat them lightly. They derive originally from writers outside our profession. They are put forward by Lyotard, Baudrillard and others more in the way of a manifesto than as the results of serious historical research. If, on the other hand, we take them seriously, some critical comment is necessary. Statements about the consequences of the Enlightenment and modernity are undoubted 'truth claims' - utterly unprovable and possibly dangerous statements about a past that lies beyond our reach. On this critique, postmodernists are hoist with their own petard.

Alternatively, the content of these truth claims may be tested against the record of scholarship. The works of Frank Manuel and other specialists in the history of the Enlightenment are at odds with the idea of a monolithic juggernaut of modernism. The certainties of Descartes are balanced by the scepticism of Hume. For every pigheaded Condorcet professing faith in unlimited progress there is a mocking Voltaire, disillusioned by the Lisbon earthquake, poking fun at the optimism of Dr Pangloss, giving up schemes of progress in favour of cultivating one's own garden. The notion that Enlightenment ruled unchallenged through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ignores the powerful anti-modernist movements that have flourished over the same period. The trajectory which took young Wordsworth and Coleridge from enthusiasm for the French Revolution to romantic conservatism was trod by many an artist and politician of that generation. 'Count' De Gobineau's theories of Aryan blood and Thomas Carlyle's muddle-headed corpus of work from his cynical history of the French Revolution to his racist occasional 'Discourse on the Nigger Question', breathe the same spirit of Romantic anti-modernism. And it is only a small step - philosophically as well as chronologically - from Carlyle's 'Heroes and Hero Worship' to Nietzsche's 'laughing ions' and *ubermenschen*. Nietzsche is, of course, a key figure for the French philosophical progenitors of postmodernism. Their silences concerning Roman-

ticism and later anti-modernist movements are more likely the results of design than ignorance - for they are the lineal descendants of a host of Enlightenment haters.

Neither can the validity of postmodernist attacks on the black record of modernity in the first half of the twentieth century be taken for granted. Modernism in the arts did not usually walk hand in hand with war and genocide. Stalin chased Kandinsky, Stravinsky and the modernist architects into exile. Goebels burned the novels and poetry of the modernists and held mocking exhibitions of the 'degenerate' co-workers in the visual arts. Modernism, on the other hand gave us Picasso's *Guerinica*, Stravinsky's *l'histoire du soldat*, Brecht's *Mother Courage* and a host of other anit-war icons. In the minds of many small-town anti-modernists in many countries, modernism stood for pacifism, sexual license and anarchy. Responsibility for Auschwitz and Hiroshima can as reasonably be ascribed to the excesses of the racist, romantic, ultra-nationalist anti-modernist forces as to the children of the Enlightenment.

The experience of twentieth century South Africa is, of course, immediately relevant to the critiques of modernism and modernity. It deserves a great deal more discussion than it has so far received in international circles. The liberal critique of the apartheid regime was that it was out of tune with the modern world - the same critique that was levelled at Afrikaners and Afrikaner nationalism beginning with the final decades of the nineteenth century. Science, said the liberals, had undermined the intellectual foundations of racism. Democracy and further economic development would destroy its grip on power. Radical analysis in the 1970s challenged this appraisal by pointing out ways in which apartheid greased the wheels of capitalist modernisation.

Plenty of evidence could be drawn on to support each point of view. The Modern - in art, thought, politics and sexual experimentation - was always a favourite whipping boy for National Party backwoodsmen. They stood four square for *Gott* and *volk* against the pretensions of atheistic internationalism. Yet Afrikaner nationalism did shift noticeably from Boer-war era anti-capitalism to a *modus vivendi* with chambers of commerce and mines. Works of 'social engineering' and urban planning carried on under the apartheid regime are demented but recognisable versions of modernist projects of progress.

POSTMODERNISM AND MODERNISM

How is one to choose between these points of view from a postmodernist perspective? It all depends on what you define as modernity - a word employed with maddening ambiguity in contemporary discussions. For some it is something that begins with Renaissance humanism and the Medici bankers, for others with Le Corbusier and Henry Ford. Such gaps between the signifier and signified suggest that the word modernity - like the word culture - has already cut loose from its definitional moorings and may mean whatever you like it to mean.

When we come to the issues of progress and grand narratives, there is a different problem. Much of the postmodern critique of progress centres on the horrors of the period 1933-1953. Subsequent misfortunes get lumped together with the Holocaust, World War II and Stalinism in a litany of diminishing status. (How can we believe in progress after Auschwitz, Hiroshima, the gulags, the Vietnam War, the invasion of Granada, the Iranian hostage crisis, the fighting in Bosnia and the Oklahoma City bombing?)

If we try to squeeze the last fifty years of Southern African history into this chronological Madam Tussaud's, the results are decidedly different. How can we believe in progress after the National Party victory in 1948, Sharpeville, the Rivonia trials, decolonization in Central Africa and Namibia, the Portuguese revolution, the Soweto uprising, the repeal of apartheid laws, Codesa and the April elections of 1994? Unless you belong to the AWB how could you *not* believe in progress?

There are two main points I want to make about the case against progress. The first is that it is decidedly Eurocentric and ignores most history since the death of Stalin. The second is that South Africa, as usual, appears to march to the beat of a different drummer. Just as world-weary Europeans are giving up grand narrative, South Africa brings us the final chapter to one of the grandest narratives that ever was - one that will continue to be written and rewritten.

GRAND AND META-NARRATIVES

Some confusion clouds discussions of grand and meta-narratives in postmodern academic circles. Some people speak as though all narrative has been called into doubt - there are only stories, which need not be bound by the conventional limitations of linear

space and time. Clever historians have shown that it is possible to do just that, provided the subject is a theme: for instance, a history of love, or sexuality, or corporal punishment. However, no historian who wants to write about forces operating over decades to produce a given phenomenon can give up an underlying assumption of linear time, even if the narrative skips back and forth over its surface.

Grand narrative, when it is not merely used as a synonym for meta-narrative, refers to works which take long swipes at the past: the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, the Rise of the West, the story of civilization, Imperialism 1870-1914. South Africa is full of grand narratives, old and new, lots of them with an upbeat resonance: the rise of the Zulu monarchy, the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, Cory's catchall *Rise of South Africa*. While there is plenty to complain about in the grand narratives I've just listed - their pretences to comprehensiveness, their silences and exclusions - it is not clear that there is anything inherently illegitimate about the enterprise. When postmodernists say 'no more grand narratives' they are expressing a taste rather than proving a proposition.

The case is different with meta-narrative. Meta-narrative is a controlling structure which locates the content of a given text within a teleological conception of past, present and future. It need never be stated overtly in the text at all. An obvious example of meta-narrative is the Christian cosmological drama of Creation. Fall, Redemption and Last Judgement. Another is Macaulay's Whiggish meta-narrative of the advance of English liberty from the Glorious Revolution to the Reform Act of 1832. For many postmodernist writers, the biggest, baddest meta-narrative of all is Marxism, with its progress from the slave mode of production through feudalism and capitalism to socialism. Conservative postmodernists slobbber over the corpse of the Marxist meta-narrative with ghoulish delight. Thus, Michael Ignatieff exults that the 'grand narrative analysis that would link all these glimpses of the future together into swaggering, predictive, nineteenth-century-style-theory is not so much beyond our reach as beyond any conceivable grasp'...We bourgeois neurotics may not have inherited the earth, but there is no returning to the systems' [8]

'The joy of being lost in an uncharted future', review of *Foregone conclusions: Against apocalyptic story* by M. A. Bernstein in *New Republic*, reprinted in *The Australian*, 3 May 1995, p. 26.

POSTMODERNISM AND MARXISM

It goes without saying that the death of Marxism was hurried on greatly by the toxic gases emitted by expiring communism in eastern Europe. Why this should affect the viability of Marxist tools of historical analysis is a well-known puzzle. However, the fact is that it has.

The world-wide turn away from Marxism affects the future of historical writing in South Africa more than any other aspect of postmodernism, because authors writing from a materialist or Neo-Marxist perspective have played so large a part in the outpouring of historical scholarship during the last twenty years. Two obvious things need to be said about this body of work. Neo-Marxists working on South African history were never apologists for Stalinism or the defunct Soviet Union. On the contrary, in many different ways they expressed abhorrence for those regimes and dismissed most of the historical scholarship that came out of Eastern Europe as flawed or naive. Second, although there were some flirtations with Althussian theory, most practitioners applauded E. P. Thompson's critique of esoteric teleological theory and Soviet Communism as set out in his 1978 publication, *The poverty of theory.*

You will search in vain for Marxist meta-narratives of inevitable progress in their books and articles. While there used to be talk of discovering 'the laws of motion' of the South African political economy, in my opinion, the dominant tendency in the nineteen seventies and early eighties was to lean in the opposite direction, towards what was then termed 'Radical Pessimism'. Having learned from Barrington Moore that there were many different versions of mature capitalism, they were ready to accept that South Africa was stuck in an undemocratic, repressive cul-de-sac.

As good followers of E. P. Thompson they were enthusiastic about the possibilities of social history. They, more than anyone else, led the movement away from grand narrative to 'little narratives' about the South African past. Shula Marks immersed herself in letters to and from 'An Experimental Doll', and then plunged into a study of nursing. Jeff Guy's researches moved away from the imperial tragedy of Zululand in the 1880s to the ecological and social dynamics of the individual family homestead. Charles van Onselen's vast project for recording the oral history of labour migrants turned his own work eventually towards a kind of Geertzian 'thick description' of the life of a single individual. (I could multiply examples.)

Those who are sceptical about the results of modernisation and who want to write little narratives do not have to set their faces against the eminent neo-Marxist historians of South Africa.

There was, however, a pronounced tendency for the neo-Marxists to emphasise the material foundations of historical change to the neglect of ideas and politics. Although Marxism had developed tools to deal with the constitution of mental life, these were not much used in South Africa. The result was history that looked like economic determinism, however much its authors protested it was not. It is easy to sympathise with young scholars resisting rustication to farms whose soils have been exhausted by previous studies or sent to pick over the tailings from a mine shaft which had already yielded up its richest ore. Postmodern approaches promise something new.

A NEW PARADIGM?

Indeed, for some it is a 'new paradigm'. Can we expect it to produce rewards as prodigious as the last one? There are some reasons for scepticism. The first is that postmodernism is not all that new. Jacques Derrida's trumpet fanfare for post-structuralism, *De la grammatologie*, appeared in 1967, not long after the books of E. P. Thompson, Christopher Hill, Eric Hobsbawm and Eugene Genovese which revived Marxism in Western historiography. Postmodernism grew up side by side with the development of neo-Marxism in South African scholarship, not after it. Looking back upon the twentieth century there are no intellectual movements which have had a run of more than thirty years. This one may already have peaked.

Second, taking postmodernism as a new theory or paradigm runs counter to that large body of postmodern writing which rejects theory, paradigms and projects.

Third, postmodern scepticism about the possibilities of knowledge of the past makes it at best an uncomfortable bedfellow for historical scholarship. Lawrence Stone as often gets things wrong as right, but there is justice in his complaint that the world still awaits its first major postmodern work of history - while there have been any number of impressive works of literary criticism. There have been good recent books on South African history that use the post-structuralist tool kit, but none which go the whole hog. More commonly, postmodern terminology is substituted for older usages with-

out a real shift in thinking. A lexicon for superficial postmodernists can readily be compiled: for ideology, write discourse; for image, write representation; for contribution to a discussion, write intervention; for enterprise or objective, write project; for era, stage, Zeitgeist, mentalité or world view, write episteme; for analytical, write hermeneutic; for source, write text; and for write, write inscribe, and so on.

Much of the same thing happened during the ascendancy of neo-Marxism. Writers with little understanding or sympathy for the theory, nonetheless spoke of social formations, modes of production, mining capital and proletarianisation.

Other local factors may inhibit the full development of postmodernist scholarship in South Africa. The attitude of 'ironic detachment' which Baudrillard commends in politics is not easy to cultivate in this politically charged, deeply divided society. While some conservatives commend the 'end of history' in Fukuyama's sense, as the final defeat of socialist dreams of betterment, who among you will openly take the postmodern line that there should be no more projects? The disillusion of European ex-communists is easy to understand. It is not so easy to pronounce yourself disillusioned by the death of apartheid. And there is still so much to do.

While the postmodern condition is nearly universal - viewable every night on the SABC, in Hillbrow and the ex-townships - postmodern scholarship is a minority taste. It lacks a populist cadre. However erudite neo-Marxist historical scholarship may have become in its Olympian academic strongholds, it was constantly engaged in building bridges to ordinary people through such projects as People's histories of South Africa and collections of oral history. The mostly white history departments of South Africa's universities live in glass houses. If they no longer profess to help us understand how the present state of things came to be, or to assist projects of betterment, some people may conclude they are expendable.

With postmodernism comes heightened conscious of difference and differences. Neo-Marxist history was not very good at difference. Even as it proliferated classes, underclasses and fractions of classes, it remained resolutely indifferent to distinctions of race and culture. Where previous scholars had seen tribesmen, the Marxists saw peasants. Van der Merwe lost his red neck, Calvinist

blinkers, and holy covenants and was reconstructed in different guises depending on class position. Zulu ethnic identity was treated as a prime example of the invention of tradition.

Acknowledging difference has its good points. Feminists, especially in Australia and North America, were early enthusiasts for postmodernism, precisely because it acknowledged the importance of gender differences in a way that liberalism and Marxism had not done. (On the other hand, to be a feminist is to have a project and thus to transgress the rules of hard-line postmodernist dogma.)

Cultivating difference also has its bad points - bad points which no South African audience needs to be reminded of. Liberals and Marxists in their own peculiar ways purported to see through difference to a common human condition which anyone might articulate or understand. Some postmodern poses replace this with an opacity of otherness, whose corollary is that only the other may speak for herself/himself. When this opacity extends to ethnicity and culture, the intellectual ghost of apartheid walks again.