Original Research

‘Hände hoch’: The South African experience of the moment of capture in North Africa

Evert Kleynhans

Received: 08 Jan. 2025; Accepted: 17 Apr. 2025; Published: 11 June 2025

Copyright: © 2025. The Author Licensee: AOSIS.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Abstract

A large number of South African troops were captured by the Axis forces in the Western Desert after the crushing defeat at Sidi Rezegh in November 1941 and the surrender of Tobruk in June 1942. Prior to these severe reverses, South African troops had barely tasted defeat on the battlefield during the Second World War. Any illusions regarding fighting prowess and invincibility were, however, short-lived and brutally dashed by the German Afrika Corps. Amid the chaos and confusion that reigned at Sidi Rezegh, and searching questions asked of the defence of Tobruk, some 13 000 South African troops were captured. For each of these men, the experience of capture differed. Most felt anger and frustration when confronted with their new status as prisoners-of-war. Mental shock, physical deprivation, and the stigma and shame associated with surrender and capture would also haunt them.

Contribution: This article provides an exploratory investigation into the experiences of South African servicemen shortly before, during and after their moment of capture in the Western Desert.

Keywords: Second World War; Union Defence Force; North Africa; Sidi Rezegh; Tobruk; capture; surrender; prisoners-of-war.

Introduction

The historiography on the South African involvement in the Second World War is extensive. The mainstay of historical attention has, however, been on the combat deployments of the Union Defence Force (UDF) to the theatres in East Africa, North Africa, Madagascar, and Italy. Despite this focus, there has been a renewed drive of late to study the South African participation in the war from new perspectives. In practical terms, this means that historians are now engaging with topics on the Union’s war effort that received scant historical attention before.

During the Second World War, nearly 15 000 South African servicemen were captured and made prisoners-of-war (POWs). As part of the overall casualties suffered by the UDF during the war, POWs accounted for nearly 42% of South African casualties sustained outside of the Union on active service. Most of these men were captured after the battle of Sidi Rezegh and following the surrender of Tobruk.¹ Unfortunately, despite the large numbers of UDF servicemen who were taken prisoner during the war, the study of the South African POW experience in general has been somewhat neglected by both popular and academic historians. This state of affairs stands in stark contrast to international historiographical trends, where the study of the POW wartime experiences continues to receive sustained interest from academic and popular historians alike.²

Despite the apparent neglect shown by South African historians to investigate the South African POW experience during the war, there are, however, several works of varying quality that are exceptions to the norm that deserve mention. Firstly, there are the published memoirs by former UDF servicemen who became POWs during the war.³ These publications are an extremely valuable source to consult because they provide a rare glimpse into the personal experience of capture and confinement. Secondly, there are also a select number of general works that deal with the matter of South African POWs during the war, the most notable written by Maxwell Leigh, Natie Greef, Paul Schamberger, Joel Mervis and Ian Gleeson.⁴ These works, despite being extremely varied in nature and quality, and mostly written by amateur historians, nevertheless add to the available historiography on the subject. Moreover, despite feeble attempts by Leigh and Gleeson at inclusivity, most of these publications instead offer an exclusive take on the wartime experience of white South African POWs. In doing so, scant historical attention is paid to the large numbers of men from the Native Military Corps (NMC), Indian and Malay Corps (IMC) and the Cape Corps (CC) who were also captured and became POWs during the war.

Karen Horn was the first South African historian to do ground-breaking academic work on the South African POWs during the war.⁵ Her doctoral dissertation, along with several peer-reviewed articles, and a well-received book publication, indeed laid the foundation for further research to be carried out on the South African POW experience during the war. While acknowledging Horn’s key contribution in opening up the field for subsequent research, it is worthwhile to note that there are several broad themes surrounding the South African POW experience that are worthy of further in-depth investigation. These include leisure time utilisation, morale and propaganda, politics and policy, camp experiences, food and consumption, escape and evasion, partisan warfare, and crime and collaboration to name but a few.

One of the themes addressed by Horn that deserves further investigation is that of the moment of capture as experienced by the approximately 13 000 South African servicemen taken prisoner during the war in the Western Desert. For each of these men, the experience of capture naturally differed. However, despite their different experiences, most of these men at some stage felt anger and frustration when confronted with their newfound status as POWs. Mental shock, physical deprivation, and the stigma and shame associated with surrender and capture soon also became prevalent among them during their subsequent movement: firstly, to localised collection areas and secondly, soon thereafter to the Libyan transit camps at Derna, Barce, and Benghazi.

The aim of this article is to provide an exploratory investigation into the experiences of the South African servicemen shortly before, during and after their moment of capture in the Western Desert. Firstly, the article emphasises the actual moment of captivity by juxtaposing the experiences of UDF troops seized after their defeat at Sidi Rezegh with the surrender of Tobruk. Secondly, the subsequent experiences of the South African troops in their various collection areas and in the transit camps at Derna, Barce, and Benghazi in Libya are investigated. In doing so, the article marshals a host of primary archival sources from the Department of Defence Archives in Pretoria, South Africa, and, along with the available secondary sources discussed supra, offers a fresh perspective on a unique aspect of the South African POW experience during the war.

The moment of capture

The American Professor of Sociology, Walter Lunden, argued that the psychological stability of a POW varies according to both the unique stage of captivity and an accompanying time factor. In most cases, soldiers are captured during combat operations marked by intense fighting, where they have reached the limits of their mental and physical endurance. There are, however, exceptions, where soldiers were captured without having offered any determined resistance. In such instances, such as the surrender of a strong defensive position, soldiers are captured either because of a tactical or operational error or as the result of poor decisions made by their commanders. Lunden argues that while soldiers often contemplated death during times of war, very few ever anticipated or even prepared for the possibility of being captured and becoming POWs. As a result, soldiers would experience the moment of capture as a completely unanticipated misfortune.⁶ This notion is confirmed by Capt. Archie Cochrane of the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) who had been captured at Crete in mid-1941. Cochrane noted:

I visualized death and wounds fairly often … but I never thought of being taken prisoner, although the impartial observer, had he been about, would probably have put our chances of being taken prisoner at about 2 to 1 …⁷

Lunden further contends that a strange psychological experience occurs within POWs during the actual moment of capture. Firstly, all POWs are disarmed upon capture, whereafter they are moved to temporary collection areas for initial processing. Secondly, the physical act of surrender naturally comes as a shock to all soldiers. The resultant effect is that most POWs become completely docile in the hands of their captors. Thirdly, owing to their recent combat experience, soldiers are sometimes wounded, disabled, or suffering from severe physical or mental shock. As a result, able-bodied men help their disabled and wounded comrades where possible, and the mortally wounded are often left to die where they have fallen during battle.⁸

During the mobile stage shortly after capture, POWs also have little time to reflect on what has happened to them. Any sign of hesitation, delay or non-compliance by the POWs could evoke a violent response from their captors such as being beaten or summarily shot. Therefore, the group of captives have no choice but to blindly follow orders during their movement to the nearby collection areas before further movement to transit camps. The mobile stage shortly after capture is further marked by low morale among the captives, which has a definite connection to the trauma and disgrace of being captured. The behaviour of the prisoners during this mobile phase of captivity also largely depends on the position and the outcome of the battle during which they were captured, as well as the stage and general progress of the war.⁹

South African servicemen who were captured during the fighting at Sidi Rezegh in November 1941 as part of Operation Crusader, formed part of the 5th South African Infantry Brigade (5 SA Bde) under the command of Brig B.F. Armstrong. During the course of the battle, 5 SA Bde was completely overrun and annihilated by a combined-arms attack launched by the 9th Panzer Regiment and 115th Infantry Regiment of the Deutches Afrika Corps (DAK).¹⁰ Despite offering a gallant defence, the South African casualties sustained during the fighting at Sidi Rezegh is telling of the catastrophe that befell the UDF during the battle: 224 men killed, a further 379 men wounded, and a staggering 3000 men captured.¹¹ This was also the first real operational setback suffered by the UDF during the war.

Most eyewitness accounts and post-war interviews conducted with the men from 5 SA Bde mention the chaos and confusion that engulfed them shortly before they were captured. For Cyril Compton:

[T]he battle moved “tremendously” fast … German tanks and armoured cars … came straight at us. The horrendous noise of the different kinds of munitions screaming past and flying in all directions was awesome …¹²

Once the final German attack on the South African positions materialised, it also appeared to SSgt B.F. Hesselbarth of the 2nd Battalion of Regiment Botha:

… [all] pandemonium appeared to have broken loose. We fired with rifles and Tommy-guns at German tanks which were not far distant … Shells flew over our heads and burst all rund us … Later on we saw two lines of German tanks approaching us. They were covered by their own artillery fire. It was literally raining heavy fire above and around us. We saw shells burst among the trucks and saw trucks fly into the air in pieces, bundles of kit and equipment being thrown into the sky.¹³

Several eyewitness accounts also mention the accompanying cacophony of modern war as experienced by the men at Sidi Rezegh. Baden Purchase recalls that the noise of incoming fire at times sounded ‘exactly like a big swarm of finches in a poplar bush’.¹⁴ For another soldier, simply referred to as KJR, ‘The air was filled with a medley of diverse sounds. There were whining noises, whistling noises, sucking noises, and harsh roaring noises, and louder than all – great blasting noises’.¹⁵

During the course of the final German attack on the positions of the 5 SA Bde, chaos, confusion and panic subsumed the South African troops.¹⁶ Major D.W. Pretorius of the 2nd Battalion of Regiment Botha briefly describes the moment before he and his men were captured:

By this time, men from the Irish [South African Irish Regiment] and T.S. [3rd Battalion Transvaal Scottish] swarmed through my lines causing panic. I heard several voices shout ‘retire, retire’. I tried to stop them and get them down again without success. I gave the order to withdraw as communication with Battalion HQ had broken down and the enemy were all around us.¹⁷

In addition to the ensuing defeat at Sidi Rezegh, the prospect of being captured caught most of the South African troops off guard. This succinctly ties into the earlier argument put forward by Lunden and Cochrane. This is confirmed by Newman Robinson, who even felt that he had been the victim of a practical joke when a group of German tanks finally overran his position.¹⁸ Robinson also regarded the moment of capture as a somewhat out-of-body experience, where his mind almost refused to accept his newfound fate.

To Robinson, this surreal episode was:

… in very much the same way as a man sometimes stands outside himself in a nightmare, and looks on with helpless horror at what is happening to him. I see myself standing alongside my truck in blank amazement, with a plate of porridge in one hand and a mug of coffee in the other, wondering what on earth had gone wrong, and feeling mildly resentful that it should have done so at breakfast time.¹⁹

The South African troops that were captured at Sidi Rezegh surrendered themselves to the German forces when it became clear that there was little point in maintaining further resistance and therefore no other option was open to them but to capitulate. In this regard, their surrender could be seen as the final gesture of disciplined, but pragmatic soldiers, who acknowledged their tactical defeat. However, this acceptance of surrender did not necessarily mean that the act of surrender was regarded as being particularly honourable. Most of the men indeed felt humiliated by the experience.²⁰

In contrast with the events that unfolded at Sidi Rezegh, the bulk of the 2nd South African Infantry Division (2 SA Div) under the command of Maj Gen H.B. Klopper were captured after the Tobruk garrison was forced to surrender within a matter of 3 days in June 1942 after being cut off and isolated by the DAK.²¹ The majority of the men from 2 SA Div who were captured after Tobruk simply surrendered without offering any determined resistance. For the most part, the South African troops were also caught unaware by their sudden surrender to the German forces, as they were led to believe that they generally occupied good defensive positions and that, despite some operational setbacks, the Allies were winning the war in the Western Desert.²² To this end, LCpl L.V. Bolton of the South African Medical Corps states that in the weeks before Tobruk fell ‘everyone was confident of victory, and [that] their information officer gave them a very optimistic summing up of the situation’.²³

It is also noteworthy that the majority of the South African servicemen who surrendered at Tobruk never contemplated the idea of being captured. Gunner R.V. Davis of the South African Artillery mentions:

We were told we had to hold out for 3 months. We thought that we would have heavy casualties, but we did not even think of being captured. Our guns had not fired at all …²⁴

This line of argument reverberates through several of the accounts of South African servicemen captured at Tobruk.²⁵ Sergeant A.N. Goldman of the Royal Durban Light Infantry shares a similar experience, which serves to confirm the argument put forward by Lunden and Cochrane:

My own feelings when I heard the news was very indicative of what everyone else felt. When Bn HQ heard of the surrender the orderly room [Sergeant] called me into his dugout and, not looking particularly glum, said: ‘They have surrendered’. My first feeling was one of elation, but then I thought: ‘Why should they surrender when “they” have got three-quarters of Tobruk?’ The true position then dawned on me: ‘They’ referred to our own command. I was astounded and flabbergasted. I had not for a moment thought that we would surrender. It seemed fantastic. We had not fired a shot.²⁶

The men also remember at times the eerie silence and definite lack of communication prevalent in Tobruk shortly before the surrender of the garrison.²⁷ Ike Rosmarin, a war correspondent present at Tobruk, recorded that the worst part ‘ … was the fact that we did not know what was happening as there were no orders from our officers. Confusion reigned with fear and panic’.²⁸ Major A.P.C. van den Heever of the Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Rifles reaffirms this point of view:

I knew, of course, precisely what had happened in my own Battalion sector, but as regards the perimeter as a whole I could only surmise and the bitterness of capture was accentuated by what, at the time, seemed to be a gigantic and avoidable failure.

To my utter astonishment there was not the sound of a gun firing anywhere. We did not know about the surrender and the quiet was most disconcerting. Over Tobruch [sic] fortress there hung a black pall of smoke, motionless in the hot air. There were literally thousands of fires all over the place, vehicles, tanks, dumps, German and Italian aircraft, still burning from the previous afternoon. Ships and stores and buildings were burning in the harbour, and in the midst of all of this inferno there was this dead silence, in strange contrast with the previous day’s noise of battle.²⁹

Unlike their counterparts at Sidi Rezegh, the mainstay of South African troops in Tobruk were captured after the fortress formally surrendered. Many of the men never expected to be captured, especially as they believed that they were occupying good defensive positions. The fact that there was no real gallant defence of the fortress, or any decisive resistance offered, with most troops not even having fired their weapons in anger, meant that the South African troops found it difficult to accept the fact that they had indeed been made POWs at Tobruk. Again, most of the men felt angered, humiliated and disillusioned by the experience, and harboured a general resentment towards the top brass for letting them down.³⁰

The collection area

After soldiers are captured and made POWs, they are immediately moved to temporary collection areas in their immediate vicinity. Prisoners-of-war are normally detained at the temporary collection areas for a short period of time ranging from mere days to even a couple of weeks. The captors utilise the collection areas to examine, classify and interrogate the POWs. Thereafter the prisoners are moved to more permanent transit camps further removed from the frontlines. During this phase of captivity, Lunden argues that prisoners generally remained silent and showed no apparent interest in anything.³¹

Prisoners-of-war were also prone to criticise their commanders during this initial stage of captivity. Their criticism, in general, stemmed from the fact that the prisoners regarded their commanders to be ‘dithering incompetent idiots’ for allowing them to be captured in the first place.³² However, the criticism expressed by the POWs could also be seen as a more general complaint against their current conditions or even an attempt to rationalise the situation they find themselves in. This state of mind, when added to the physical exhaustion and deprivations experienced earlier during the moment of capture, as well as the lack of food, water and shelter at the collection areas, generally brought about complete inertia among the men. However, beneath all of this, most men concealed a basic fear of the unknown, particularly as their immediate futures were rather uncertain at this stage. The mental state of the POWs during this stage of captivity can therefore be characterised ‘as somewhat of a stunned stupor, mixed with a mild form of chagrin and some degree of anger’.³³

According to Harold Denny, a war correspondent of the New York Times who was present at Sidi Rezegh, the South African troops realised that ‘once the tanks came through, their machine guns sweeping every foot of the sandy plain, there was nothing for the survivors to do but to surrender’.³⁴ The German troops that captured the South Africans made a distinct impression on the men. Captain James Tasker remembers that the German soldiers who captured him and his men were extremely rude, and ‘cursed us most volubly and gutturally all the time … and managed to convey to us that we should run to the prisoner’s concentration area’.³⁵ Robinson recounts that he ‘surrendered to a German soldier whose appearance was so detestable that he found it hard to believe that his captor could in fact be German … he was convinced that they would be lined up and shot’.³⁶

After the men surrendered their weapons, their German captors, by means of ‘various gesticulations and weird sounds’,³⁷ indicated that the men had to march on the double to a temporary collection area located near the battlefield. By dusk, Tasker and his companions soon joined a long column of South African troops that marched nearly a mile into the desert to the prisoner’s collection area. Tasker notes that despite the outcome of the battle and their newfound status as POWs, the ‘lads were in wonderful spirits and hid what real feelings they must have had’.³⁸

Once the men arrived in the collection area, they were required to hand over most of their possessions, except playing cards and pay books according to some men, whereafter they were placed under heavy guard for the night. Various accounts recall the bitterly cold evening endured in their exposed positions in the desert at the collection area.³⁹ Reverend Patrick Nolan, a chaplain attached to 5 SA Bde, observed:

… I am not likely to forget that night because of the bitter cold and the suffering of our wounded. We had not been permitted to take with us a sufficiency of blankets, nor even a supply of medicines … [we] spent the night walking up and down to keep ourselves warm.⁴⁰

By daybreak the remnants of 5 SA Bde were marched through the wrecked battlefield at Sidi Rezegh into the heart of the German Division. The Germans fully exploited the situation for propaganda purposes, and soon ‘photographers – probably Goebbels men – rushed up and took our photos when they got the chance’.⁴¹ Some men also recall seeing Erwin Rommel at this stage, who drew up in a car and surveyed them.⁴² According to Pte Whittaker of the South African Medical Corps, Rommel, whom the South Africans generally held in high regard, admonished his men for taking so many prisoners, and warned the South Africans that they still had a long way to go before they would reach the Libyan transit camps. He also cautioned them that they would suffer hardships along the way.⁴³ Nolan also mentions that during this whole period at the collection area, no food or water were issued to the men⁴⁴; while other accounts state that the POWs received a biscuit and a bit of Italian bully beef the previous night that had to be shared between two men.⁴⁵

At this stage, the Germans handed the South African troops over to the Italians. While most accounts confirm that the South Africans were generally impressed with stature, fighting prowess and organisational acumen of the German troops, the same could not be said for their new Italian guards who they immediately regarded with contempt.⁴⁶ Later in the day, several trucks arrived at the collection area to transport the men further down the line to the POW transit camps in Libya. Because of the large volumes of prisoners who needed to be transported and the limited number of vehicles present, many of the South African troops had to walk in the general direction westwards past Tobruk and onwards to Derna, Barce and Benghazi on the so-called ‘thirst marches’ across the desert. During these marches, the men suffered great physical deprivations because of the continued lack of food and water, with some men even fainting from dehydration.⁴⁷ According to Nolan, the men were generally uncertain where they were headed to, but ‘hoped it would not be far because of our hunger and thirst’.⁴⁸

Unlike their counterparts captured at Sidi Rezegh, time was somewhat on the side of the South African troops that were captured at Tobruk. This was largely because of the vastness of the Tobruk fortress and the actual time it took the German and Italian forces to completely occupy the area. As a result, large pockets of troops were yet to be physically captured and rounded up, although Tobruk had officially surrendered. The soldiers used this interlude to either destroy their weapons and equipment, to physically and mentally prepare for their eventual capture, or, to seize the opportunity to try and escape.⁴⁹

Several accounts confirm the systematic destruction of weapons and equipment. Sergeant Goldman wrote:

When we had got over the first shock of the surrender, we began carrying out … destroying documents and arms … When the work of the destruction was through, we just had to sit and wait; everyone was very forlorn.⁵⁰

Paul de Villiers mentions that when the order was received to destroy weapons and equipment, he ‘bent [his] revolver so that it would never shoot again, and broke [his] compass and binoculars’.⁵¹ In the long run, however, de Villiers regrets the fact that he destroyed the compass, as it could have been very valuable had the opportunity arrived to escape. Horn contends that the destruction of weapons and equipment was synonymous with the act of surrender, especially when soldiers realised that continued resistance would be futile. However, this was no easy task for men who, only days before, had meticulously cleaned and maintained the very weapons that had carried them through previous combat operations.⁵²

The fact that some South African troops at Tobruk had the opportunity to physically and mentally prepare for their imminent capture stands in stark contrast to the experiences of men captured at Sidi Rezegh who did not have such an opportunity. The mental and physical preparations took on various forms. Davis, for instance, confirms that after his battery had destroyed their trucks and equipment and spiked their guns, they had ‘as big a meal as you can eat, because heaven knows when you will get another’.⁵³ Laurie du Preez recalls that while awaiting capture, the men:

… filled [their] water-bottles and helped [themselves] to canned food from the ration piles. The food, together with only the barest necessities, [were] placed in [their] knapsacks on the outside of which [they] strapped [their] overcoats and blankets.⁵⁴

Du Preez mentions that these proactive measures were ‘worth their weight in gold’ and would prove extremely handy throughout the move: firstly, to the Libyan transit camps and secondly, to the more permanent camps in Italy between the end of 1941 and 1942. However, despite the fortitude of being able to somewhat prepare for their eventual capture, most of the men remained silent and depressed throughout this period.⁵⁵

There were, however, some exceptions to the norm. Several accounts confirm the fact that groups of South African soldiers seized the opportunity to make a bid for their freedom from Tobruk. These men chose to disregard the order to surrender, and, instead of waiting to be captured and simply accepting their newfound status as POWs, chose to try to escape from Tobruk and make it back to Allied lines further eastwards. While there remains some contention over whether or not the order for ‘every man for himself’ was ever given at Tobruk, several men decided to escape on their own accord.⁵⁶ For some of the escapees, their luck only partially held out, and they were soon rounded up during their ensuing bids for freedom from Tobruk.⁵⁷ Men who successfully escaped from Tobruk, however, had to contend with the harsh climate and terrain of the Western Desert, scant rations and water supplies, and the ever-present threat of running into an enemy patrol and being captured. Despite these obstacles, a number of South African escapers managed to successfully make it back to Allied lines in the Western Desert.⁵⁸

It also took a considerable period of time for the German forces to round up and take prisoner the scattered pockets of Allied troops deployed around the fortress of Tobruk. This was, however, a very lengthy process, that naturally added to the fear, uncertainty and apprehensiveness experienced by the men. The comparative stillness that engulfed Tobruk also only served to exacerbate the tension prevalent among the men. Some decided to disregard their safety and investigate what was going on for themselves. Inevitably, these forays into the unknown brought them into contact with German patrols, who formalised their capture.⁵⁹ Davis succinctly describes the moment when he was captured:

As [the tank] stopped near us, a young Jerry jumped out. With his tommy gun he motioned us to leave the wadi, and to form up. The other tanks came up. The crews took cigarettes off a few fellows. A cameraman snapped us, laden with blankets, kitbags, tins of food and water-cans. For some inconsequential reasons I found myself carrying a huge tin of Libby’s asparagus. I was soon to wish that I had chosen something more substantial. Two little German infantrymen had been told to guard us. One of them said, ‘Tobruk marsch’, and we did.⁶⁰

Once the South African troops were rounded up, as with their comrades at Sidi Rezegh, they too were marched to a collection area within the centre of Tobruk. Here the men were kept in a makeshift barbed wire enclosure for several days, where they were exposed to the extreme desert climate and unforgiving terrain. They also had to sleep in the open. Moreover, during this period the men also received little food and water from their German captors. However, the lack of water within Tobruk was also largely the result of the successful destruction efforts carried out by the Allied troops after the surrender of the garrison.⁶¹ Within a matter of a few days, a decision was taken by the German and Italian military authorities to move the prisoners at Tobruk to the POW transit camps at Derna, Barce and Benghazi in Libya – respectively, these transit camps were located approximately 145 km, 340 km, and 430 km away from Tobruk. As was the case at Sidi Rezegh, the Germans again handed the POWs over to the Italians, who henceforth assumed responsibility for their movement and temporary sojourn in the Libyan transit camps.⁶²

The transit camp

After being screened at the collection area, prisoners were moved further to the rear of the frontlines to a temporary transit camp. Here, the POWs remained for an indefinite period of time before they were moved to a more permanent camp. During the movement to the transit camp from the collection area, food and water were normally at a minimum. Moreover, prisoners were rarely provided with an opportunity to rest and recover from mental and physical exhaustion. In fact, these privations were simply perpetuated during the move to the transit camp. The POWs, however, remained somewhat motivated during this phase by the hope that the conditions at their new camp would be better than at the collection area. The prisoners also, somewhat unrealistically, believed that their new surroundings would provide them with ample food, water, shelter and medical care, and perhaps even time for rest, relaxation and letter writing.⁶³ In reality, however, the hopes and dreams of the POWs were nearly always shattered when they arrived at the transit camp, where the harsh conditions encountered left the men bitterly disillusioned. Not only was the transit camp for the most part nothing more than an overcrowded, barbed wire, enclosure, but access to adequate food, water, shelter and medical care remained lacking.⁶⁴

Once the POWs arrived at the transit camp, the men generally underwent a peculiar mental process. They were stripped of their former reputations and prestige and often separated from their friends and comrades. Moreover, the psychological effect of friendly propaganda also soon disappeared against the backdrop of the new power relationship that developed between the captors and captives. The prisoners immediately became aware of the power and force of their captors, who, through assuming a ‘trigger happy’ attitude, maintained discipline and control over the POWs. At this stage, the prisoners also noticed the planned misinformation and counter-propaganda by their captors, which were meant to undermine the collective morale and cohesiveness of the captives. Therefore, the conditions in the transit camp – marked by tension, disorder and uncertainty – were meant to physically and mentally wear the prisoners down. In most cases, this situation only persisted for a few days, whereafter the captives and captors adjusted to one another, as well as to their new roles and surroundings.⁶⁵

For both batches captured at Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk, the journeys from their respective collection areas to the POW transit camps in Libya were an arduous one – especially as some men were forced to travel on foot. The distances covered were great and ranged anywhere from 170 km to 430 km. The -so-called ‘thirst marches’ were completed over several days during which the men had to endure long hours of marching. The privations suffered over this period were naturally accentuated by the harsh desert climate and terrain.⁶⁶

Whittaker, along with several other accounts,⁶⁷ accurately describes the prevalent conditions for those captured at Sidi Rezegh during the ‘thirst marches’:

There was little water – just what the men were carrying … On the second day [the] absence of water and food began to tell. At midday they were given one biscuit and half a cup of water. At nightfall they stopped … This brought them to Gazala where they slept in a wire enclosure. There was plenty of water [that was] appreciated after a journey of forty miles. It was freezing at night and very hot during the day.⁶⁸

Furthermore, an anonymous South African officer had:

[T]he impression that a great deal of Italian cruelty to prisoners [during this period] was due to the total inability to organise and a habit of getting terribly excited whenever the smallest crises arises.⁶⁹

This point is reinforced by Horn, who contends that the Italians were simply incapable, both in terms of manpower and resources, of effectively dealing with the large numbers of prisoners in their care that had to be moved from the collection areas to the POW transit camps in Libya. Unsurprisingly, the inability of the Italian authorities to effectively manage the large numbers of POWs in their care during the ‘thirst marches’ would extend to the Libyan transit camps and eventually the more permanent camps in Italy itself.⁷⁰ While these arguments are perhaps unfair and too simplistic, it is worth noting that the overall supply problems of the Axis forces in the Western Desert were compounded by the capture of large numbers of prisoners throughout 1941 and 1942.

The sight that greeted the POWs on their arrival at the transit camps was not one of encouragement. The South African prisoners were, however, so tired after their previous ordeals that they simply ‘slept in the open on the still damp ground [without] any discomfort until [they] awoke in the morning’.⁷¹ Du Preez laments that it was:

… in the Benghazi cage [where] the misery of the men really began. The camp was enclosed by a wire fence with a huge gate on the one side. And except for that, and the small tents, conditions were exactly the same as in the cage at Tobruk with no question of the conditions laid down by the Geneva Convention and appertaining to [POW] camps being observed.

The camp was divided into two compounds, each being about 100 X 150 metres and housing approximately 5000 prisoners. Heat, dust and flies are always tormenting factors in North Africa – even in well-organised camps – and in that cage, crowded as we were, with no proper latrines and with most of the men soon suffering from dysentery through lack of proper food, it was torture.⁷²

Cochrane argued that once the prisoners settled into life at the transit camps, the Subacute Gefangenitis (Dulagitis) syndrome soon set in amongst them. In this instance, Subacute Gefangenitis is directly related to the observed psychological and physiological impact that imprisonment has on incarcerated men. Cochrane argued that several factors underpin the Subacute Gefangenitis syndrome:

• acute hunger and signs of malnutrition
• a marked shortage of water
• the prevalence of disease, especially diarrhoea
• primitive and deficient sanitation
• overcrowding
• heightened nervous tension within the camp
• continually deteriorating morale and general apathy
• the appearance of neurotic symptoms
• various aggressive tendencies
• widespread distrust and theft.⁷³

Cochrane’s proposed framework provides a useful lens into the psychological and physiological impact that initial imprisonment had on South African troops in the Libyan transit camps.

During this period of captivity, the majority of South African POWs experienced acute hunger, with the resultant signs of malnutrition soon becoming evident amongst the men. These conditions were often exacerbated by a marked shortage of water. Horn argues that the men almost instantly became aware of the fact that they needed food and water if they were to survive the transit camps at all.⁷⁴ According to Harry Wolhuter, the hunger pains of the prisoners were so acute that even sex was no longer an important topic of discussion.⁷⁵

De Villiers further confirms that the majority of the POWs lost a lot of weight during this period, and that ‘[there] certainly were very few paunches in our camp!’⁷⁶ Horn mentions that prisoners on average lost between 20 kg and 30 kg each during this phase of captivity. While the distribution and quality of food marginally improved once the POWs reached the transit camp at Benghazi, it did little to raise the spirits of the men as they were still held captive in barbed wire enclosures in which makeshift shelters and tents offered no real protection from the elements.⁷⁷ De Villiers mentions that the prisoners received a daily ration that consisted of:

… a small tin of meat [that we believed to be] horse meat. Then there was a loaf of bread, about the size of a small bun. This usually arrived after dark, still hot from the oven and often already off. Then there was a teaspoon or two of sugar and a teaspoon of coffee and, I think, 10 cigarettes.⁷⁸

According to Nolan, the POWs often faced rather unique difficulties when trying to eat their food:

I looked in blank despair at the hard biscuit that was given to me with the bully beef and went to the Italian sentry and asked him to break the biscuit with his bayonet. No dentist in the world could have made dentures capable of standing up to this dry biscuit. The sentry told me that the biscuit was not so bad if soaked in water, but when we went to look for water, we found that the supply had run out.⁷⁹

If the white South African POWs thought they had it bad in the Libyan transit camps, their fellow countrymen from the NMC, IMC and the CC experienced worse conditions and treatment. Both the Italian and German military authorities did not consider the stipulations of the 1929 Geneva Convention to have any bearing on their treatment of black, Indian and mixed race POWs. Thus, not only were the basic rights of these South African POWs denied in the transit camps, but much like back home in the Union, they had to contend with blatant racism from their captors daily.⁸⁰ Moreover, these men were also forced to do manual labour in aid of the Italian war effort in North Africa, which directly contravened the stipulations of the Geneva Convention. However, the fact that these men were allowed to leave the transit camps for manual labour purposes, meant that they at times had the opportunity to steal food to supplement their meagre rations or sabotage the Italian war effort. If they had any surplus food left that they smuggled back into the camps, their white comrades ‘would lay siege to their tents at night to beg the crumbs of their charity’.⁸¹

Some white POWs were also afforded the opportunity to volunteer for work-parties, which meant that they then received double rations for the day and had access to unlimited supplies of water. Again, if they had any leftovers or liberated food, they would smuggle it back to the camp to share it with their fellow prisoners.⁸² These work-parties, as de Villiers mentions, proved immensely popular among the POWs, and he ‘just found it [near] impossible to get on one of these work-parties, as the men started their queue at the gate long before sunrise. I tried once or twice and gave it up as a bad job’.⁸³

The Libyan transit camps, for the most part, had very primitive and deficient sanitation, which meant that diseases such as dysentery and viral infections such as meningitis soon broke out among the prisoners. Moreover, the Italian authorities remained wary of an outbreak of typhoid too. This situation was exacerbated by inadequate ablution facilities at all of the transit camps, with Horn stating that in Benghazi there was only one toilet for use by nearly 4000 men.⁸⁴ De Villiers also records that once he arrived at Benghazi, he went down with a case of dysentery. However, he was not alone, as dysentery took hold among the large numbers of South African POWs. De Villiers recalls:

[the] latrines were just deep pits with nothing to cover them. The dysentery made us very weak, and I think most of us were a bit scared of falling into the pits. For three days I remembered nothing – just [lying] around. I think someone must have brought me some Epsom salts from the medical tent and that must have done the trick.⁸⁵

It was not only dysentery that affected the health and well-being of the POWs in the Libyan transit camps. Because of the squalor and unsanitary conditions prevalent within the camps, and along with the overcrowding, an outbreak of lice was soon noticed.⁸⁶ The lice within the camps did not discriminate against rank or race, and, according to Du Preez, it was ‘not long [before] every one of us had these horrible insects crawling over us … I don’t think there was any single factor that contributed more than lice to making our lives as prisoners hell’.⁸⁷

The large numbers of Allied servicemen captured in the Western Desert between 1941 and 1942 meant that the Libyan transit camps were soon overcrowded. While overcrowding naturally affected the provision of adequate food, water, shelter and medical care by the Italian authorities, it also served to heighten the nervous tension prevalent in the transit camps.⁸⁸ Moreover, among such a large body of POWs, a deterioration in morale, a state of general apathy and the appearance of neurotic symptoms soon came to the fore. One of the ever-present occurrences was the incessant rumour mill within the camps. The rumours that spread among the men, often relating to imminent liberation and the Allied progress in the Western Desert, were often wild in nature, entirely far-fetched and untrue. Nevertheless, whether true or not, these rumours seemed to help keep up the spirits of the POWs, as de Villiers testifies:

There is nothing like a lack of news to break down morale. But there were lots of rumours. Rumours would be passed around from person to person and from group to group. Most rumours, of course, consisted of victories for the Allies […] everything was hearsay […] We thrived on rumours. We lived for them. Even when we said we would not believe a rumour again, we still hoped that it just might come true.⁸⁹

The heightened nervous tension within the Libyan transit camps was accentuated by the ‘trigger happy’ attitudes assumed by the Italian and Senussi Arab guards to enforce discipline and control over the prisoners. Horn maintains that the Italian guards soon took advantage of their new positions of power over the POWs, and often used violence or simply the threat thereof, to try and command respect from the men and maintain order in the camps.⁹⁰ Several accounts testify to the brutality that the prisoners suffered at the hands of the Italian and Senussi guards, which included deliberate theft of personal property, torture, indiscriminate violence and even murder.⁹¹

The prisoners also soon became aware of the planned misinformation and counter-propaganda used by their captors to undermine the morale and cohesiveness of the men. An anonymous South African officer recalls at least two different instances where he caught German and Italian guards spreading false rumours about the progress of the Axis war effort in general. He stated that he had no qualms in challenging the men on their apparent lies, whereafter they soon backtracked when they could not verify their sources or answer his searching questions.⁹²

Depression and melancholy also manifested among the men. Such occurrences were directly the result of a breakdown in morale among the prisoners. The incessant false rumour mill also did not help to raise the spirits of the men. According to de Villiers, for some men the appalling conditions and stress of life in the transit camps were too much to handle. Some men soon became entirely withdrawn and dispirited.⁹³ Rosmarin, for instance, recalled that when he had come across his former commanding officer, the man was ‘too dispirited even to shoo away a mangy desert dog which was lifting his leg on his mackintosh’.⁹⁴ However, not all of the POWs succumbed to bouts of depression and instead tried to find various other ways with which to keep themselves busy. Some of the activities that the men occupied themselves with included arts and crafts, camp sports, religious gatherings, music and entertainment, gambling and even letter writing. These activities were all coping mechanisms employed by the men to help keep their sanity, while away the time, and make life in Libyan transit camps as bearable as possible.⁹⁵

Two other events that occurred in the transit camps in Libya frequently lifted the morale of the POWs. On numerous occasions, the men imprisoned at Benghazi witnessed countless Allied air attacks on the harbour. In some instances, the men even recognised planes from the South African Air Force conducting the attacks on the harbour, which immediately lifted their morale. The men were normally forewarned of an impending attack when they spotted reconnaissance planes conducting high-level reconnaissance sorties over the harbour in the morning.⁹⁶ De Villiers describes the unfolding of one such attack on the Benghazi harbour:

The attack came later in the afternoon, carried out by heavy American Flying Fortresses. Any smoke going up after such an attack signalled a hit, and there was loud cheering [from amongst the prisoners]. We were warned that the Italians might take exception to our cheering, but it was very difficult not to show our enthusiasm for our own side … There was, of course, great disappointment when no hits were registered.⁹⁷

News of successful escape attempts by prisoners from the Libyan transit camps also helped to raise the morale of the South African POWs. When the prisoners arrived at the transit camps, rudimentary escape committees were established amongst the men to help plan and manage any future escape attempts. While numerous individuals attempted to escape from the transit camps, only a handful made it back to Allied lines. Because of the hostile local population and the unforgiving natural environment, the majority of the men were soon recaptured within a matter of hours after they escaped the transit camps. Despite the negative effect that recapture may have had on the morale of the individuals concerned, and the punishment meted out by Italian authorities, several of the men would reattempt to escape in due course. Such determined efforts, especially when successful, had a definite impact on raising the morale of the POWs in the Libyan transit camps.⁹⁸

While many of the South African POWs were convinced that they would be liberated from the transit camps in Libya in due course, others, such as Du Preez, realised that it would be impossible to survive the trying conditions for an indefinite period of time. To this end, he commented to a friend in the transit camp that ‘the sooner we shake the dust of North Africa off our feet the better it’ll be for us … Anybody who lives under these conditions for much longer will finish up six feet under the ground’.⁹⁹

Life in the Libyan transit camps has been described as a ‘dog eat dog’ world by Horn. This description directly speaks to the widespread distrust that existed among the POWs and the several incidences of theft that occurred within the camps. While there was a general rule among the men that pilfering from the Italian guards and authorities was fair game and often celebrated, there were strict codes of morality regarding stealing from among fellow prisoners. Horn mentions that if prisoners were caught stealing from their fellow POWs, they would be severely punished by their own side. At Benghazi for instance, two British prisoners were caught stealing food from their fellow prisoners, whereafter they were chained to a gate for a whole day without food or water. On another occasion, a POW was caught stealing a pair of boots from his fellow prisoners, and then selling them to the Italian guards. The culprit, who was described as ‘weak and lousier than most’, was soon apprehended by his fellow prisoners. Thereafter, the POWs meted out their own version of ‘justice’ over a week until such time that the Italian camp commandant placed the man under guard for his own safety. It is therefore clear that there were strict codes of conduct that governed day-to-day life in the ‘dog eat dog’ world, which was the Libyan transit camps.¹⁰⁰

The discussion above, by utilising elements from Cochrane’s Subacute Gefangenitis syndrome, clearly illustrates some of the psychological and physiological challenges that the South African and Allied POWs had to deal with during their sojourn in the Libyan transit camps. It is also clear that the conditions in the transit camps were marked by tension, disorder and uncertainty, which all combined to wear the men down both physically and mentally. However, it is further evident that this state of affairs only persisted for a short while, whereafter the captives and their captors adjusted to one another, as well as to their new roles and surroundings. Once the South African prisoners were moved from the Libyan transit camps to the more permanent POW camps in Italy between the end of 1941 and 1942, and later on Germany towards the end of 1943, they would again experience some of the elements from Cochrane’s Subacute Gefangenitis syndrome as they once more had to adjust to their new surroundings.

Conclusion

The article provided a much-needed investigation into the varied experiences of South African servicemen shortly before, during and after their moment of capture in the Western Desert. The initial focus of the article was on the actual moment of capture, where the differing experiences of the UDF troops captured at Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk were compared with one another. Despite the distinct differences experienced by the men during the moment of capture, there were also some common experiences evident among the two groups of soldiers that related to mental shock, physical deprivation, and the stigma and shame associated with capture and surrender. The article further considered the subsequent experiences of the South African POWs in the Western Desert: (1) in their various collection areas at Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk; and (2) in the Libyan transit camps at Derna, Barce and Benghazi. By using Cochrane’s Subacute Gefangenitis syndrome as a point of reference, the article illuminated the psychological and physiological impact that initial imprisonment in the Libyan transit camps had on South African troops. While it is evident that the conditions in the transit camps were marked by tension, disorder, deprivation and a large degree of uncertainty that were meant to physically and mentally wear the prisoners down, it is striking that this state of affairs only lasted for a short period of time whereafter the captives and their captors not only adjusted to one another but also to their new roles and surroundings. This process would repeat itself when the South African prisoners were moved from the Libyan transit camps to the more permanent POW camps in Italy between the end of 1941 and 1942 and later in Germany towards the end of 1943. Here the men would again experience some of the elements from Cochrane’s Subacute Gefangenitis syndrome while adjusting to their new roles and surroundings. By marshalling a host of primary archival material from the Department of Defence Archives, and substantiated with secondary sources, this article has offered a fresh perspective on a unique aspect of the South African POW experience during the war. In doing so, the article also builds on the broader historiography of South African involvement during the Second World War.

Acknowledgements

The author declares that they have no financial or personal relationships that may have inappropriately influenced them in writing this article.

E.K. is the sole author of this research article.

This article followed all ethical standards for research without direct contact with human or animal subjects.

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

The author confirms that the data supporting this study and its findings are available within the article.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and are the product of professional research. It does not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated institution, funder, agency or that of the publisher. The author is responsible for this article’s results, findings and content.

References

Footnotes

1. Ian van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa (Jonathan Ball, 2015), 212.

2. See for instance: Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich, eds., Prisoners of War and Their Captors in World War II (Berg Publishers, 1996); Bob Moore and Barbara Hately-Broad, eds., Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace: Captivity, Homecoming and Memory in World War II (Berg Publishers, 2005); Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich, The British Empire and Its Italian Prisoners of War, 1940–1947 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Simon Mackenzie, The Colditz Myth: British and Commonwealth Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany (OUP, 2004); Arieh J. Kochavi, Confronting Captivity Britain and the United States and their POWs in Nazi Germany (UNC Press, 2005); Adrian Gilbert, POW Allied Prisoners in Europe 1939–1945 (John Murray, 2007); Joan Beaumont, “Rank, Privilege and Prisoners of War,” War & Society 1, no. 1 (1983): 67–94, https://doi.org/10.1179/106980483790303126.

3. See for instance: D. Scott, My Luck Still Held (Unie Volkspers, 1946); Harry Rose-Innes, The Po Valley Break: The True Story of Three POWs and Their Bid for Freedom in Mussolini’s Italy (Valiant Publishers, 1976); Peter Ogilvie and Newman Robinson, In the Bag (Macmillan, 1975); Ike Rosmarin, Inside Story (W.J. Flesch & Partners, 1999); James B. Chutter, Captivity Captive (Jonathan Cape, 1954); Laurie Du Preez, Inside the Cage: The True Story of a South African’s Escape from an Italian Prisoner-of-War Camp (Struik, 1973); Uys Krige, The Way Out (Maskew Miller, 1979); S.G. Wolhuter, The Melancholy State: The Story of a South African Prisoner-of-War (Howard Timmins, 1983); Paul De Villiers, The Second World War: Just a Small Part (Self-Publication, circa 2006).

4. Maxwell Leigh, Captives Courageous: South African Prisoners of War World War II (Ashanti Publishing, 1992); I.B. Greeff, “South African Prisoners-of-War on the Long Marches 1944–1945,” Military History Journal 8, no. 6 (1991), http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol086ig.html (Accessed 27 October 2020); Joel Mervis, South Africa in World War II: 50 Years (The Executive, 1989); Ian Gleeson, The Unknown Force: Black, Indian and Coloured Soldiers through Two World Wars (Ashanti Publishing, 1994).

5. Karen Horn, “South African Prisoner-of-War Experience during and after World War II: 1939–c.1950” (PhD diss., Stellenbosch University, 2012); Karen Horn, “Narratives from North Africa: South African Prisoner-of-War Experience Following the Fall of Tobruk, June 1942,” Historia 56, no. 2 (2011), 94–112, https://upjournals.up.ac.za/index.php/historia/article/view/1022; Karen Horn, “‘Stalag Happy’: South African Prisoners of War during World War Two (1939–1945) and their Experience and Use of Humour,” South African Historical Journal 63, no. 4. (2011), 537–52, https://doi.org/10.1080/02582473.2011.627374; Karen Horn, “Changing Attitudes among South African Prisoners of War towards their Italian Captors during World War II, 1942–1943,” Scientia Militaria 40, no. 3 (2012), 200–21, https://doi.org/10.5787/40-3-1033; Karen Horn, “Researching South African Prisoners-of-War Experience during World War II: Historiography, Archives and Oral Testimony,” Journal for Contemporary History 39, no. 2 (2014), 81–99, https://doi.org/10.38140/sjch.v39i2.289; Karen Horn, “‘History from the inside’: South African Prisoner-of-War Experience in Work Camp 1169, Dresden, 1943–1945,” War & Society 33, no. 4 (2014), 269–82, https://doi.org/10.1179/0729247314Z.00000000042; Karen Horn and David Brock Katz, “The Surrender of Tobruk in 1942: Press Reports and Soldiers’ Memories,” Scientia Militaria 44, no. 1 (2016), 190–208, https://doi.org/10.5787/44-1-1167; Karen Horn, “‘A Sudden Sickening Sensation’: South African Prisoner-of-War Experience on Board the San Sebastian, December 1941,” Historia 63, no. 1 (2018), 112–29, https://doi.org/10.17159/2309-8392/2018/v63n1a6; Karen Horn, In Enemy Hands: South African POWs in World War II (Jonathan Ball, 2015).

6. Walter Lunden, “Captivity Psychoses among Prisoners of War”, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 39, no. 6 (1949). 724–5.

7. A.L. Cochrane, “Notes on the Psychology of Prisoners of War”, The British Medical Journal 1, no. 4442 (1946), 282.

8. Lunden, “Captivity Psychoses,” 725. For more on the mental trauma experienced prior to and shortly after capture, see for instance: Yücel Yanikdağ, Healing the Nation: Prisoners of War, Medicine and Nationalism in Turkey, 1914–1939 (Edinburgh University Press, 2013).

9. Lunden, “Captivity Psychoses,” 725–6. For a more detailed discussion on some of the reasons why Allied soldiers surrendered during the campaign in the Western Desert, see Jonathan Fennel, “Courage and Cowardice in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and Defeat in the Summer of 1942,” War in History 20, no. 1 (2013), 99–122, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26098645.

10. For a more detailed description of the battle of Sidi Rezegh from a South African perspective, see David Brock Katz, South African versus Rommel: The Untold Story of the Desert War in World War II (Delta Books, 2019), 111–54.

11. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 27.

12. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 26.

13. DOD Archives, Union War Histories (UWH) Civil, Box 132, File: NAREP ME 6. 2nd Battalion, Regiment Botha Regimental History from September 1941.

14. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 127, File: NAREP ME 1. Western Desert Campaign – Baden’s Letter Written to Joe after the Battle of Sidi Rezegh, 13 Dec 1941.

15. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 127, File: NAREP ME 2. Western Desert Campaign – Story from Sidi Rezegh by KJR, undated.

16. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 127, File: NAREP ME 1. Western Desert Campaign – Sgt Buyskes, “I” Sgt 3TS, 16 Feb 1943.

17. DOD Archives, Union War Histories (UWH) Civil, Box 132, File: NAREP ME 6. 2nd Battalion, Regiment Botha Regimental History from September 1941.

18. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 27–8.

19. Ogilvie and Robinson, In the Bag, 12–13.

20. Mark Connelly and Walter Miller, “The BEF and the Issue of Surrender on the Western Front in 1940,” War in History 11, no. 4 (2004), 436–7, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26061987; Fennel, “Courage and Cowardice,” 106; Horn, In Enemy Hands, 30.

21. For a more detailed description of the surrender of Tobruk from a South African perspective, see Katz, South African versus Rommel, 183–216. For more on the still contentious surrender of Tobruk, see for instance: Andrew Stewart, “The ‘Atomic’ Despatch: Field Marshal Auchinleck, the Fall of the Tobruk Garrison and Post-War Anglo-South African Relation,” Scientia Militaria 31, no. 1 (2008), 78–94, https://doi.org/10.5787/36-1-44; Andrew Stewart, “The Klopper Affair: Anglo-South Africa Relations and the Surrender of the Tobruk Garrison,” Twentieth Century British History 17, no. 4 (2006), 516–44, https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/hwl024.

22. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 33–40.

23. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 127, File: NAREP ME 1. Western Desert Campaign – L/Cpl L.V Bolton SAMC of 14 Fd Amb re Tobruk, undated.

24. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 127, File: NAREP ME 1. Western Desert Campaign – R.V. Davis, 4th Bty 2 Fd Regt SAA, From Gazala to Tobruk (Feb–June 1942).

25. See for instance De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 48–51; Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 4–7; Chutter, Captivity Captive, 23–36; Horn, In Enemy Hands, 39–40.

26. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 127, File: NAREP ME 1. Western Desert Campaign – Tobruk, Account by Lt A.N. Goldman DCM and Sgt C.H. Spear MM, 2 RDLI, undated.

27. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 34–9; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 127, File: NAREP ME 1. Western Desert Campaign – Statement by Col Du Plessis on the Fall of Tobruk, 14 Jun 1943.

28. Rosmarin, Inside Story, 11.

29. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 129, File: NAREP ME 3. Western Desert Campaign – Narrative of Major A.P.C. van den Heever ‘My Capture at Tobruk’, undated.

30. De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 56; Fennel, “Courage and Cowardice,” 122.

31. Lunden, “Captivity Psychoses,” 726–7.

32. Connelly and Miller, “The BEF and the Issue of Surrender,” 440–1.

33. Cochrane, “Notes on the Psychology of Prisoners of War,” 282; Lunden, “Captivity Psychoses,” 726–7.

34. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 127, File: NAREP ME 1. Western Desert Campaign – The South Africans at Rezegh in Libya 20–23 November 1941.

35. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 129, File: NAREP ME 3. Western Desert Campaign – Capt James Tasker’s Sidi Rezegh and Escape Story, 20–25 Nov 1941.

36. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 28.

37. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 129, File: NAREP ME 3. Western Desert Campaign – Capt James Tasker’s Sidi Rezegh and Escape Story, 20–25 Nov 1941.

38. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 129, File: NAREP ME 3. Western Desert Campaign – Capt James Tasker’s Sidi Rezegh and Escape Story, 20–25 Nov 1941.

39. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 129, File: NAREP ME 3. Western Desert Campaign – “I Saw it Happen” – Eyewitness Accounts from North Africa, undated.

40. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 128, File: NAREP ME 2. Western Desert Campaign – Sidi Rezegh and Benghazi POW Camp by (Rev) Maj Patrick J. Nolan, 23 Nov 41 – 27 Dec 41.

41. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 129, File: NAREP ME 3. Western Desert Campaign – “I Saw it Happen” – Eyewitness Accounts from North Africa, undated.

42. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 45–7.

43. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 129, File: NAREP ME 3. Western Desert Campaign – Mr Whittaker (SAMC), Sidi Rezegh and Capture afterwards, June 1942. Also see Horn, In Enemy Hands, 47–8.

44. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 128, File: NAREP ME 2. Western Desert Campaign – Sidi Rezegh and Benghazi POW Camp by (Rev) Maj Patrick J. Nolan, 23 Nov 41 – 27 Dec 41.

45. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 129, File: NAREP ME 3. Western Desert Campaign – “I Saw it Happen” – Eyewitness Accounts from North Africa, undated.

46. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 45–7.

47. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 50–1.

48. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 128, File: NAREP ME 2. Western Desert Campaign – Sidi Rezegh and Benghazi POW Camp by (Rev) Maj Patrick J. Nolan, 23 Nov 41 – 27 Dec 41. Also see for instance Chutter, Captivity Captive, 54.

49. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 40–2.

50. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 127, File: NAREP ME 1. Western Desert Campaign – Tobruk, Account by Lt A.N. Goldman DCM and Sgt C.H. Spear MM, 2 RDLI, undated.

51. De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 56.

52. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 41.

53. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 127, File: NAREP ME 1. Western Desert Campaign – R.V. Davis, 4th Bty 2 Fd Regt SAA, From Gazala to Tobruk (Feb–June 1942).

54. Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 6.

55. Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 6. For more on the value of these preparations, see De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 56.

56. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 139, File: NAREP ME 13. Statements by Tobruk POWs, 19 Nov 1944; Horn, In Enemy Hands, 38–43.

57. See for instance Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 6–21; De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 52–6.

58. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 65–8; Chutter, Captivity Captive, 38–9. For a more in-depth discussion on the South African escapers and evaders, see Evert Kleynhans and Will Gordon, “Springbok Escapers and Evaders in the Western Desert, 1941–1942: An Exploratory Investigation,” Journal of African Military History 6, no. 1 (2022), 33–67, https://doi.org/10.1163/24680966-bja10011.

59. De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 52–6.

60. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 127, File: NAREP ME 1. Western Desert Campaign – R.V. Davis, 4th Bty 2 Fd Regt SAA, From Gazala to Tobruk (Feb–June 1942).

61. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 128, File: NAREP ME 2. Western Desert Campaign – Sidi Rezegh and Benghazi POW Camp by (Rev) Maj Patrick J. Nolan, 23 Nov 41 – 27 Dec 41; Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 6–21; Chutter, Captivity Captive, 42–50.

62. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 49–53.

63. Lunden, “Captivity Psychoses,” 727.

64. Cochrane, “Notes on the Psychology of Prisoners of War,” 282–3.

65. Lunden, “Captivity Psychoses,” 727–8. For a more detailed discussion on the use of POWs as sources of intelligence, see for instance Brad W. Gladman, “Air power and intelligence in the western desert campaign, 1940–43,” Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 4 (1998), 144–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432508; Kent Fedorowich, “Axis prisoners of war as sources for British military intelligence, 1939–42,” Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 2 (1999), 156–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432543.

66. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 130, File: NAREP ME 4. Enemy Treatment of Prisoners in Cyrenaica – Extracts from a Report by a South African Officer, undated; Horn, In Enemy Hands, 50–1.

67. See for instance Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 30–1; Chutter, Captivity Captive, 51–2.

68. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 129, File: NAREP ME 3. Western Desert Campaign – Mr Whittaker (SAMC), Sidi Rezegh and Capture afterwards, June 1942. Also see Horn, In Enemy Hands, 47–8.

69. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 130, File: NAREP ME 4. Enemy Treatment of Prisoners in Cyrenaica – Extracts from a Report by a South African Officer, undated.

70. See for instance DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 128, File: NAREP ME 2. Western Desert Campaign – Sidi Rezegh and Benghazi POW Camp by (Rev) Maj Patrick J. Nolan, 23 Nov 41 – 27 Dec 41; Horn, In Enemy Hands, 54–7.

71. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 128, File: NAREP ME 2. Western Desert Campaign – Sidi Rezegh and Benghazi POW Camp by (Rev) Maj Patrick J. Nolan, 23 Nov 41 – 27 Dec 41.

72. Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 31–2.

73. Cochrane, “Notes on the Psychology of Prisoners of War,” 282–3.

74. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 61; Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 30; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 129, File: NAREP ME 3. Western Desert Campaign – Statement by 196202V Pte G.D. Van Zyl of C Coy 1SAP on Tobruk, Experience as POW in ME and Italy, and escape, 19 Jan 1944.

75. Wolhuter, The Melancholy State, 36.

76. De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 60.

77. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 130, File: NAREP ME 4. Enemy Treatment of Prisoners in Cyrenaica – Extracts from a Report by a South African Officer, undated; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 132, File: NAREP ME 6. Western Desert Campaign – Statement by W.R. Alvin re Bardia, Halfaya, Tobruk, and subsequent experiences as POW and escape in Italy, undated; Horn, In Enemy Hands, 61.

78. De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 60.

79. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 128, File: NAREP ME 2. Western Desert Campaign – Sidi Rezegh and Benghazi POW Camp by (Rev) Maj Patrick J. Nolan, 23 Nov 41 – 27 Dec 41.

80. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 130, File: NAREP ME 4. Axis Cruelty to Native Prisoners, 11 Sept 1942.

81. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 57–60.

82. Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 32–4; Chutter, Captivity Captive, 52–3.

83. De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 62.

84. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 130, File: NAREP ME 4. Enemy Treatment of Prisoners in Cyrenaica – Extracts from a Report by a South African Officer, undated; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 129, File: NAREP ME 3. Western Desert Campaign – Statement by 196202V Pte G.D. Van Zyl of C Coy 1SAP on Tobruk, Experience as POW in ME and Italy, and escape, 19 Jan 1944; Horn, In Enemy Hands, 64.

85. De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 60.

86. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 130, File: NAREP ME 4. Enemy Treatment of Prisoners in Cyrenaica – Extracts from a Report by a South African Officer, undated.

87. Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 39.

88. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 128, File: NAREP ME 2. Western Desert Campaign – Sidi Rezegh and Benghazi POW Camp by (Rev) Maj Patrick J. Nolan, 23 Nov 41 – 27 Dec 41.

89. De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 67.

90. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 54–6.

91. Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 30–6; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 129, File: NAREP ME 3. Western Desert Campaign – Statement by 196202V Pte G.D. Van Zyl of C Coy 1 SAP on Tobruk, experience as POW in ME and Italy, and escape, 19 Jan 1944.

92. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 130, File: NAREP ME 4. Enemy Treatment of Prisoners in Cyrenaica – Extracts from a Report by a South African Officer, undated. Also see Fedorowich, Axis prisoners of war, 156–78; Gladman, “Air power and intelligence,” 144–62.

93. De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 67.

94. Rosmarin, Inside Story, 14.

95. See for instance Horn, In Enemy Hands, 62–5; Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 33; De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 62–4; Chutter, Captivity Captive, 53–4; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 128, File: NAREP ME 2. Western Desert Campaign – Sidi Rezegh and Benghazi POW Camp by (Rev) Maj Patrick J. Nolan, 23 Nov 41 – 27 Dec 41.

96. Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 39; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 128, File: NAREP ME 2. Western Desert Campaign – Sidi Rezegh and Benghazi POW Camp by (Rev) Maj Patrick J. Nolan, 23 Nov 41 – 27 Dec 41.

97. De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 66–7.

98. See for instance Horn, In Enemy Hands, 62–5; Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 32–24; De Villiers, Just a Small Part, 65–8; Chutter, Captivity Captive, 54–5.

99. Du Preez, Inside the Cage, 40.

100. Horn, In Enemy Hands, 62–3.